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This research began with searching for a solution to temporary housing that residents can 
receive more quickly than current available temporary housing with an easier transition into 
permanent housing allowing for better overall community recovery. A framework was developed 
that suggests optimal temporary housing units at the household-level and at the community-level. 
The framework includes three key inputs that feed into an integrated sustainability and resilience 
evaluation model that provides tradeoffs between temporary housing options for a household. 
The three inputs include (1) the disaster scenario which describes the type of hazard and the level 
of damage to the pre-disaster home, (2) a description of the particular household in need of 
temporary housing, and (3) the types of temporary housing options to be evaluated. The 
framework is exemplified through both a wind hazard event and a flood hazard event causing 
moderate to severe damage to the pre-disaster homes of the households being considered. At the 
household-level, the tradeoffs for temporary housing are compared for six different households 
varying substantially based on perceived social and economic vulnerability. Common and 
innovative temporary housing options are considered in the examples, including manufactured 
homes, custom built units, hotels, and other government funding programs. A newly developed 
integrated sustainability and resilience evaluation model measures eight quantitative qualities of 
the temporary housing units that collectively formulate a quality of life index. The quantities are 
assigned weights based on priorities and needs of the household occupying the temporary 
housing unit. The temporary housing option resulting with the highest quality of life index is 
recommended to the household. The community-level framework uses the household-level 
analysis for each type of household in the community along with external constraints such as 
budgetary restrictions to determine an optimal community-wide solution that seeks to maximize 
the quality of life of all households while reducing cost of temporary housing. 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
 Billion-dollar disasters caused by extreme weather events are occurring at an increasing 
rate, with this rate expected to continue increasing. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Association (NOAA) has reported over 207 billion-dollar disasters since 1989, with 130 of those 
occurring after 2005 (NOAA, 2018). Numbers associated with evacuations, damaged homes, 
displaced residents, households in need of temporary housing, and dollars in damage continually 
have been observed to increase throughout recent years. These numbers will continue to increase 
due to climate change, population growth, urbanization, and aging infrastructure (Theis, 2012). 
Table 1 provides a few examples of how damage and dislocation numbers are increasing; 
therefore, the number of people left without their homes post-disaster is increasing as well, 
driving the need for sufficient emergency planning along with adequate post-disaster housing.  
Table 1. Statistics from Recent Disasters 
Disaster  Year Data Source 
Hurricane Katrina 2005 Displaced over one million Gulf Coast residents Liu et al., 2005 
Hurricanes Ike and Dolly 2008 Over 100,000 homes flooded  Smith & Formby, 2017 
Hurricane Sandy 2012 Housing assistance to over 174,000 households Fugate, 2013 
Louisiana Floods 2016 Over 100,000 households received some type of 
temporary housing assistance 
FEMA, 2017a 
Hurricane Matthew 2016 Nearly $67 million approved for housing 
assistance 
FEMA, 2017b 
Hurricane Harvey 2017 Over 563,000 homes damaged Smith & Formby, 2017 
Hurricane Irma 2017 Mandatory evacuation of 6.5 million people Stanley, 2017 
 
Emergency management occurs in four stages: planning, mitigation, response, and recovery. 
Planning and mitigations take place before a disaster, and response and recovery occur post-
disaster. Post-disaster housing is considered to take place in four, albeit nonlinear and 
overlapping, stages as well, and span response and recovery. These four stages were first defined 
by Quarantelli and include emergency shelter, temporary shelter, temporary housing, and 
permanent housing (1982).  
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The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) designs their housing recovery 
programs around the following timeline and descriptions (U.S. Senate, 2009). Emergency shelter 
is the phase immediately following the disaster lasting for approximately two weeks. Temporary 
shelter begins two weeks post-disaster and spans up to three months, when temporary housing 
can be provided. Temporary housing lasts anywhere from 3 to 18 months and is intended to get 
displaced households back into their pre-disaster routine. Permanent housing follows temporary 
housing and becomes the long-term housing solution post-disaster. Throughout recent years, the 
response phase of emergency management has improved with the development of organizations 
such as the American Red Cross (Comerio, 2004), but the same issues with recovery and post-
disaster housing occur time and time again. One of the main reoccurring post-disaster issues is 
the time spent in the temporary housing phase. Based on current FEMA housing recovery 
programs, temporary housing is expected to last up to 18 months. It has, however, lasted 
significantly longer in many of the billion-dollar disasters that have occurred since 2005. Indeed, 
after Hurricane Katrina, the final temporary housing unit left New Orleans six years after the 
storm hit southern Louisiana (Muskal, 2012). Many of the physical structures used during the 
temporary housing phase are not designed to last these long periods of time, particularly when 
considering structural integrity of the unit, and well-being of the occupants. 
Disparities in timing, quality, and location of temporary housing have been observed after the 
past decade of disasters (Sutley and Hamideh, 2017). The specific needs of socially vulnerable 
households are often overlooked in the existing recovery programs: most live in hazard prone 
areas, have lower quality housing construction, live in poorly built neighborhoods, are renters 
(and therefore have less control over dislocation decisions, as well as not applicable for recovery 
funds), have lower incomes, savings, and often do not have insurance, thus further hindering 
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households’ abilities to recover (Kamel and Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004; Sutley and Hamideh, 
2017). To receive certain types of aid after a disaster, specific criteria must be met, and losses 
must be proven. Oftentimes, low income, and racial and ethnic minority households do not have 
enough possessions pre-disaster to demonstrate substantial loss caused by the disaster or the 
required paperwork demonstrating ownership of their home, thus having those with higher 
property values receiving more aid by proving greater losses (Van Zandt and Sloan, 2017). 
Vulnerable populations, specifically low-income households, who experience issues receiving 
financial aid recover slower as a direct result (Bolin & Stanford, 1991; Kamel & Loukaitou-
Sideris, 2004). 
Following the disparities in distribution and timing of temporary housing after Hurricane 
Katrina, and the timeline for temporary housing observed after 2016 and 2017 disasters, 
particularly the Louisiana floods and Hurricanes Matthew, Harvey, and Irma, further research on 
temporary housing is a necessity. The present research provides a new integrated sustainability 
and resilience evaluation model applied to a selection of the existing types of temporary housing 
units. The model is designed at both the household-level taking into account the individual 
household’s needs and preferences, and the community-level taking into account the needs of the 
entire community and the funds allocated to house everyone in need. The model includes three 
inputs specifying the disaster type, the household, and the types of temporary housing available. 
The model includes a process for measuring sustainability and resilience qualities of temporary 
housing, including adaptability, customizability, population stability, environmental impacts, 
health impacts, financial cost, structural integrity, and hazard vulnerability. These qualities are 
used to formulate a quality of life index. Given a disaster, a particular household, and the 
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available temporary housing options, the integrated model will generate tradeoffs across qualities 
based on household preferences, and the quality of life index. 
In order to describe how the model was formulated, a background of previous work on post-
disaster temporary housing will be presented along with summaries of both common and 
innovative temporary housing accommodations and programs that have been used after recent 
disasters. Observations, successes, and areas of improvement for all of the types of temporary 
housing solutions are highlighted from an extensive content-analysis of the literature in order to 
better understand the temporary housing programs and the experiences of households residing in 
the units. The formulation of the newly developed framework, its inputs, the integrated model, 
and the outputs are described. Finally, two analysis examples are presented, one implementing 




CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents a history of work that has been made with regard to post-disaster 
temporary housing specifically to better understand the state of temporary housing and how this 
knowledge can be expanded and developed.  
Quarantelli (1982; 1995) first noted the terms “sheltering” and “housing” were being used 
interchangeably throughout the literature without distinction. In order to close this gap, he 
specified four distinct shelter and housing phases post-disaster: emergency shelter, temporary 
shelter, temporary housing, and permanent housing. Emergency sheltering is referred to when 
disaster victims seek lodging outside of their permanent home for short periods of time, either 
hours or overnight. Temporary sheltering extends longer than just the emergency period; it can 
span several days, but the victims do not normally make effort to reestablish their pre-disaster 
lifestyle. In many cases these two sheltering phases overlap, but some behavioral aspects are 
distinguishable. For example, emergency shelter is generally not concerned with meeting the 
immediate needs of the victims residing in the shelter since the expectation is that everyone will 
return home within hours. Temporary shelter on the other had has more of a roll with regard to 
immediate needs of the victims such as determining their access to food, water, and a place to 
sleep.  
The housing phases (i.e., temporary and permanent housing) require more of residential 
structures, and less of mass sheltering units. The housing phase also includes means for the 
victims to resume their pre-disaster routine and lifestyle. Unlike the two housing phases, the 
temporary housing to permanent hosing transition is much more concrete. More often than not, 
the permanent housing phase results in the households returning to their repaired pre-disaster 
home, or disaster new, but otherwise similar, home. When low-income households, or 
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households without insurance, experience significant damage to their home and loss to their 
belongings, it can be very difficult for them to acquire permanent housing. In these cases, 
haphazardly, the temporary housing unit was turned into permanent housing. For example, 
households were residing in units that were used as temporary housing while their permanent 
pre-disaster home was being repaired, but the repairs never happened leaving the households to 
remain in the previously defined “temporary” units (Quarantelli 1982; Quarantelli 1995).  
Quarantelli (1982) analyzed three previous disasters to investigate all four housing recovery 
phases and the components of a disaster from response through recovery. He highlighted the 
context of the community, threat conditions, warning and impact, behavior patterns of response 
groups, evacuation, sheltering phase, return to the community, temporary housing, permanent 
housing, and post disaster recovery. The three disasters considered as case studies were the 
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania flood, Xenia, Ohio tornado, and the Grand Isle, Nebraska tornado. 
Based on his observations from these three disasters he found that renters were more likely to 
apply for assistance over homeowners, not all who would qualify for assistance applied, and 
often times those who withdrew their application were never followed up with, therefore it is 
unknown their post-disaster situation. He also observed differences in social classes having 
different opinions on living in mobile homes, or manufactured housing units, temporarily. For 
example, it was reported that middle-class families did not seem to like these manufactured 
housing units, and those with a higher socioeconomic status preferred to receive rental assistance 
over the actual unit. Group sites tended to have a negative stigma attached to them; most 
households preferred to have the manufactured housing unit on their property to ensure peace of 
mind and safety. It was observed that not much progress was made to investigate what would 
make a group site feel safer and run smoother. A common concern of those in group sites was 
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the impacts of this type of lifestyle on the social pathologies of children residents. Another 
common observation was that higher-income victims occupied the majority of the available 
rental units as a form of temporary housing. Finding units for the elderly, lower-income, and 
minority groups were frequently a problem post-disaster which led to theories of income being a 
possible factor, but this has not been proven. Quarantelli (1982) pointed out recurring patterns in 
temporary housing where more research was needed in 1982 (36 years ago), and as uncovered 
through this thesis research, these gaps largely still exist.  
Quarantelli (1995) also discussed the issues with both the sheltering and housing phases post- 
disaster. He suggested issues with post-disaster sheltering and housing came more from the 
planning and operational agencies implementing the sheltering and housing programs and less 
with the disaster victim occupants. Issues were attributed to pre-disaster housing inventories, 
failure to recognize pre-disaster conflicts and differences in community power; inadequate use of 
surviving community resources; erratic organizational mobilization; poor inter-organizational co-
ordination; difficulties in intergroup information flow; and other organizational and community-
level factors which make the problems in preparing for and providing sheltering and housing. He 
continued to explain that problems would continue to grow in the future with changes to 
household composition, changes in age distribution, and changes in social expectations about 
disaster help and relief. These observations pointed out by Quarantelli (1982; 1995) paved the 
way for much more developed research to be completed in the area of temporary housing. 
The Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989 in San Francisco sparked interest in temporary housing 
observations discussed specifically by Comerio (1997). She noted that those who were renting 
before the earthquake were able to be re-housed fairly quickly, within two months, due to the 
number of vacancies in the disaster area at the time. This is not always the case, especially in 
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current times when urban area vacancies are scarce. She also observed that those who were 
housed quickly for this particular disaster were pre-disaster renters and were low- to moderate-
income households. Some groups of people, such as immigrants, generally sought aid through 
community organizations and charities for fear of repercussions through the federal government 
assistance. A large number of the homes destroyed in the earthquake housed the rural poor, 
elderly, indigent, and illegal immigrant which can be related to affordable housing not being 
always built to the highest standard. In the early 1990s and still today, affordable housing tends 
to be rundown buildings which are more susceptible to experiencing damage through routine and 
extreme hazard events. Households residing in these types of circumstances in 1989 relied 
heavily on the aid of private charities, as opposed to government aid, because disaster assistance 
was designed to help single-family homeowners.  
Olshansky et al (2006) pointed out improving notes on temporary housing based on the 
outcomes of the Northridge Earthquake of 1994 in Los Angeles and the 1995 Kobe, Japan 
earthquake. He stated two major findings in order to have a successful temporary housing 
program: funding should come from an external source, and the unit should be in an ideal 
location to aid households in the rebuilding process. He also suggested that temporary along with 
permanent housing are important aspects that should be considered in pre-disaster planning in 
order for a smoother recovery post-disaster. 
El Anwar et al (2008; 2009) presented a newly developed framework for optimal temporary 
housing arrangements. He defined temporary housing as tent cities, travel trailers, mobile homes, 
apartments, public housing units, hotels and motels, cruise ships, and military bases. His model 
developed was designed to minimize four specific qualities: socioeconomic disruptions of the 
victims, vulnerability of the temporary unit, environmental impacts onto the community from 
9 
unit construction, and the total public expenditures of the temporary housing facilities. He 
developed indices to quantify these four qualities and set target values of the indices as 
optimization objectives. The socioeconomic disruption index aimed for minimal delivery and 
installation time, but maximum housing quality and safety. The vulnerability index aimed to 
minimize the vulnerability to other hazards that could occur as a result to the current disaster, 
such as landslides, aftershocks, and fires. The environmental impact index aimed to minimizing 
the impacts on the community by measuring the effects on the soil, air quality, water quality, and 
level of noise during the construction process. Lastly, the public expenditure index sought to 
reduce either rental cost or total purchase cost of a temporary housing unit. In order to use the 
indices a set of inputs were developed: number of displaced households; environmental 
information such as soil, water quality, and air quality involved in measuring environmental 
impacts; temporary housing facilities available and information regarding their location, cost, 
size, delivery and installation time; and data involving post-disaster hazards such as safety 
distances for each hazard, for example the distance from a temporary housing unit to the 
epicenter of a potential earthquake, and probability of occurrence. The model for temporary 
housing arrangements also included a normalization module and an optimization module. The 
normalization module calculated a weighted performance of the temporary housing arrangement 
considering the four indices to demonstrate the overall performance for each arrangement. The 
optimization module was used to generate and compare optimal tradeoffs for each of the four 
objectives. This was used to generate solutions, or arrangements, based on the values of each set 
of indices. The output of the model was an optimal arrangement of temporary housing facilities 
that sought to minimize all of the previously described optimization criteria. This model 
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provided decision makers to identify the relative weights, the objective performance and the 
temporary housing arrangement assignments that are generated from the optimal solution.  
The model developed by El Anwar (2009) is the first record of any system developed to 
quantify seeming unquantifiable qualities of temporary housing units, while considering the 
effects on the occupants, not just the convenience of the assistance providers. Furthermore, El 
Anwar (2009) is also the only record of any quantitative study on post-disaster temporary 
housing. The work presented here provides a significant step forward on post-disaster temporary 
housing assignment considering household needs and preferences, as well as community-level 
constraints.   
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CHAPTER III. CONTENT-ANALYSIS 
A content-analysis of the literature was performed to understand what types of temporary 
housing units and programs were successful or unsuccessful after previous disasters. This 
analysis consists of two parts: (1) summaries of various types of temporary housing programs 
that have been implemented in recent disasters and (2) experiences of households going through 
post-disaster temporary housing in these types of programs and accommodations. The temporary 
housing program summaries were developed from program websites and information sheets for 
obtaining post-disaster assistance, along with other pilot program reports, and manufacturer 
websites and details; little to no information was found through the peer-reviewed academic 
literature. The following subsection details temporary housing programs that have been available 
to households through all or some of the U.S. disaster since 2005 Hurricane Katrina. These 
programs provide support for temporary housing units, including manufactured housing units, 
hotel stays, apartment buildings, custom built units, and those utilizing the pre-disaster home.  
Current Temporary Housing Programs 
FEMA developed a program, Individuals and Households Program (IHP) that provides 
assistance in wake of disaster. IHP can provide financial assistance, or direct assistance to those 
victims of disaster who may be underinsured, or not insured at all (FEMA, 2017c). Financial 
housing assistance can take four forms: rental assistance, home repair assistance, home 
replacement assistance, and lodging expense reimbursement. Rental assistance includes aid given 
while repairs are made to pre-disaster homes or other circumstances leading to the transition to 
permanent housing and may come to aid in renting a home, apartment, manufactured home, 
recreational vehicle, and the like. Home repair assistance is finance given to homeowners to aid 
with the repairs, utilities, and private access routes for the home. Financial assistance, in some 
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circumstances, may be given to help replace a homeowner’s pre-disaster uninsured, or 
underinsured, home that was completely destroyed by the particular disaster (FEMA, 2017c). 
Lodging expense reimbursement can be used for more short-term stays such as those at hotels. 
Hotels are used as post-disaster housing between the temporary shelter and temporary housing 
phases. Because of the abundance of hotels and the limited vacancies in other rental properties, 
hotel stays have become a common form of temporary housing. Hotels accept the FEMA-
provided vouchers on a volunteer basis and allow victims to reside throughout the duration of 
time as specified by FEMA (Hardman, 2016). 
 Direct housing assistance is used mostly when vacancies in rental properties are high, 
therefore reducing the number of households that can receive rental assistance. Direct housing 
takes three different forms: manufactured housing units, Multi-Family Lease and Repair, and 
permanent of semi-permanent housing construction (FEMA, 2017c). Manufactured housing units 
(MHUs) are generally the type unit that comes to mind when thinking of common types of 
temporary housing thought of as the most commonly use temporary housing unit, but these are 
actually use only as a last resort option (FEMA, 2016a). While millions of Americans live and 
own their own MHU, and in some cases, in wake of disaster, some households have sufficient 
funds to purchase their own MHU as part of their own individual housing recovery, but for the 
duration of this paper manufactured housing units will refer to the specific FEMA-issued 
manufactured housing units as a temporary housing unit as part of the post-disaster direct 
housing assistance. 
 The second form of direct housing assistance is Multi-Family Lease and Repair. This 
program is designed to aid multi-family residential property owners in repairing their property 
while allowing displaced households to reside in the units during the allotted temporary housing 
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phase (FEMA, 2013). In order for a property to be eligible for this assistance program, the 
property must have previously been a multi-family housing property and must be located within 
the disaster area. A lease agreement value is made based on the fair market rent in the area, the 
number of units on the property, and the number of months remaining in the specified temporary 
housing phase. If the total cost of repairs falls in under this lease agreement value, then it is 
feasible to use the property for the Multi-Family Lease and Repair program, and FEMA will pay 
the remainder of funds in the form of monthly rent per unit to the landlord. If the cost to repair is 
the same as the lease agreement value, then FEMA will not pay additional monthly rent to the 
landlord. If the repair cost exceeds the lease agreement value, then a 25% increase in the fair 
market rate may be considered, and the property can be re-evaluated for implementation (FEMA, 
2013). Other stipulations for this program are that the property must be repaired in two months; 
it must be in close proximity to everyday community needs such as local schools, grocery stores, 
and hospitals; and the property must provide all management services as they would have pre-
disaster such as building maintenance (FEMA, 2013).  
 The third form of direct housing assistance is permanent or semi-permanent housing 
construction. This involves home repairs when other types of financial or direct housing 
assistance is not feasible or not cost effective (FEMA, 2017c). One particular program that falls 
in this category is FEMA’s Shelter at Home program. The Shelter at Home program is a home 
repair program that allows homeowner households to reside in their own pre-disaster home as a 
form of temporary housing (FEMA, 2016b). If repairs can be made to the home to create a safe 
shelter under the price point of $15,000, then the home can be eligible for this program. An 
inspector is sent to the home to determine if the home’s repairs falls within the allotted funds, 
and if so, repairs are made by contractors hired by the state. The repairs are supposed to be 
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temporary in nature, creating a safe place to reside while the household takes care of their 
permanent repairs on their own. Some of these “bare minimum” repairs include mucking out the 
home, basic restoration and installation of electricity and water heater, removing wet dry-wall 
and insulation, ensuring one properly working bathroom in the home, and can also include up to 
$500 in basic cooking and refrigeration appliances (FEMA, 2016b). Some examples of these 
repairs can be found in figure 1. The Shelter at Home program was implement in Louisiana after 
the floods throughout the southern part of the state in August 2016. Each home eligible for the 
program averaged $10,500 in repairs and 3 weeks for repair work to be completed (Crisp, 2017).  
 
Figure 1. Shelter at Home Temporary Repairs (FEMA, 2016b): (a) Exterior Door 
Replacement; (b) Outlet Replacement; (c) Bathroom Vanity; (d) Kitchen Sink 
 
Two other types of temporary housing programs, independent of FEMA housing 
assistance, involve custom built units and were developed as a result of previous disasters, 
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Hurricane Katrina and Hurricanes Dolly and Ike, respectively. First, the Katrina Cottage which 
was created in wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The Katrina Cottage was designed by 
Marianne Cusato in an effort to develop an alternative to the commonly stigmatized 
manufactured housing unit. The magnitude of destruction and displacement following Hurricane 
Katrina gave insight to the short comings of current temporary housing programs and 
procedures, which lead Cusato to develop a solution that provided a unit that was fast, 
affordable, and safe while simultaneously providing an attractive place to live with the desired 
permanency needed to feel comfortable to return back to normal life (Cusato, 2018). Katrina 
Cottages can be installed temporarily on pre-disaster private property or permanently, to remain 
on the property after the temporary housing phase (Levine et al., 2007). These units range from 
308 ft2 up to 1807 ft2 and are built with hurricane resistant materials to withstand winds up to 
150 mph (Katrina Cottages, 2006). When implemented along the Gulf Coast after Hurricane 
Katrina, several variations of the cottage were created with the aid of local architects based on 
the location of the unit (Miller, 2006). Figure 2 shows the exterior view of a typical Katrina 
Cottage. 
 
Figure 2. Katrina Cottage (Cusato, 2018) 
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The second custom built temporary housing unit was designed specifically for the 
RAPIDO program. This RAPIDO program, along with its RAPIDO units, was developed after 
Hurricanes Dolly and Ike destroyed a significant portion of the Rio Grande Valley in South 
Texas in 2008. Brownsville was one of the most affected cities by the hurricanes; which also had 
the highest concentration of low-income neighborhoods called colonias. Colonias were 
neighborhoods generally inhabited by Hispanic- and Mexican-Americans with a median income 
of $28,523. The neighborhoods were significantly underdeveloped, lacking standard housing 
developments and necessities like water, electricity, and paved streets (Binkovitz, 2016). After 
Hurricanes Dolly and Ike, more than 578,000 colonia residents applied for disaster assistance, 
but approximately 85% were denied under the clause "deferred maintenance” (Binkovitz, 2016). 
Since homes were not in proper condition prior to the storm, a damage assessment could not 
distinguish what damage resulted from the hurricanes versus the previously existing condition of 
the home (Zandt and Sloan, 2017). Since disaster assistance was denied, many residents of these 
low-income communities were forced to stay in their damaged and molded homes with no other 
option (Binkovitz, 2016). The RAPIDO program was developed to help these vulnerable 
households. 
 The concept of the RAPIDO program was to develop a solution specific to a certain 
community that would easily transition from temporary to permanent housing (Morales-Diaz, 
2016). The housing program consisted of a temporary housing “CORE” that families moved into 
shortly after a disaster. The CORE is expandable thereby creating larger, permanent homes. The 
program was executed as a three-step process. First the family received a CORE equipped with 
essential living amenities; the family resided in the CORE for four months while resources were 
allocated for permanent expansions. Second, as soon as the time came to move forward on the 
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expansions, families met one on one with designers to select a floorplan that best supported their 
needs and lifestyle (e.g., number of bed and bathrooms). Finally, after the design selections were 
complete, the CORE expansions began. The expansion process took around 60 days to be 
completed. Thus, displaced households were back in their permanent home just four months after 
the disaster, with expanded space just six months after the disaster. The developers of the 
RAPIDO program worked closely with the residents to make sure that their needs were being 
met in the design of the home and that the home felt as if it was native to the area. RAPIDO 
wanted to provide a temporary to permanent solution that households safe and comfortable 
residing in (Morales-Diaz, 2016). Figure 3 depicts the CORE of the RAPIDO and the eventual 
expansion to a permanent home. 
 
Figure 3. RAPIDO Units (Morales-Diaz, 2016): (a) Temporary CORE; (b) Permanent 
Home Expansion  
  
Although there are several types of housing assistance provided by FEMA and other new 
and innovative programs that have been developed, temporary housing accommodations of 
interest highlighted above are FEMA-issued manufactured housing units, hotel stays, Multi-
Family Lease and Repair, Shelter at Home, Katrina Cottages, and RAPIDO. These particular 
programs have been either used numerous times throughout recent disaster history or have been 
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implemented in great depth allowing for sufficient data collection on household from those 
residing in these accommodations. 
In the next section of the content-analysis, reports, research articles, news articles, and 
other public records were analyzed to extract qualitative and quantitative experiences of 
households going through post-disaster temporary housing. Through this analysis, common 
themes emerged and were consistent across the different types of temporary housing options. In 
total, seven recurring themes were identified, including ease of transition to permanent housing, 
location of the unit, economic recovery of the community, job creation for victims, health 
impacts on victims, customizability of the unit, cost of the unit, and the structural design level of 
the unit. These themes, or qualities from the household’s perspective, inform which temporary 
housing units were the most or least desirable with respect to different characteristics. This 
section provides a detailed description of each theme, and anecdotal evidence from the literature 
and post-disaster reports supporting how each type of temporary housing unit measures against 
each theme.  
Transition to Permanent Housing 
The ultimate goal of temporary housing is to provide a temporary place for a household 
to stay until they can get back into their previous permanent home, or a new permanent home. 
With this in mind, the development of some temporary housing units has focusing around a 
smoother transition into permanent housing, including RAPIDO, Katrina Cottages, and FEMA’s 
Shelter at Home and Multi-Family Lease and Repair programs.  
RAPIDO has been reported to be the most successful with permanent housing transitions 
(Morales-Diaz, 2016). Since this program was developed with the thought of creating a 
temporary to permanent solution, it shines in that regard. As discussed previously, each 
19 
household receives a “CORE shortly after the disaster and can be expanded to various sizes 
thereby creating larger, permanent homes. The RAPIDO allows the household to have a smaller, 
temporary unit equipped with essential living amenities until expansions can be made. As soon 
as the time came to move forward on the expansions, families do not have to move homes, they 
can remain in the same home helping their recovery my minimizing resettlement time.  
Katrina Cottages also shined with respect to transitioning to permanent housing (Cusato, 
2018). These units were installed temporarily or converted to a permanent structure. The units 
had removable undercarriages in order to be placed on permanent foundations. These units were 
slightly bigger than the RAPIDO CORE or a typical manufactured housing unit (MHU), either 
two or three bedrooms which made the permanent installation and acceptance a possibility (ABT 
Associates, Inc., 2009).  
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Shelter at Home program also 
created a smooth temporary to permanent housing transition (FEMA, 2016b). The program was 
intended for households to come back to a restored house in their familiar community rather than 
having to move out and resettle in a manufactured housing unit (MHU) (Hardy, 2017a). The 
temporary repairs included in the program turn a household’s home into a safe place to reside 
while simultaneously allowing them to start permanent repairs in a timely manner.  
FEMA’s Multi-Family Lease and Repair program created a different approach for 
households to transition from temporary to permanent housing relative to the other programs 
discussed thus far. This program required the applicant to sign and abide by a FEMA Temporary 
Housing Agreement which includes the development of a realistic permanent housing plan and 
requires regular meetings with a FEMA representative to discuss progress towards the pre-
established permanent housing plan (FEMA, 2013). Although these households eventually had to 
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move, the program facilitates a permanent solution that made their transition to permanent 
housing smoother.  
FEMA provides two additional temporary housing accommodations, MHUs and hotel 
stays. These options do not have features that easily transition to permanent housing. They 
require households to move out of their pre-disaster home into a totally new space, and after 
some time, move again into a permanent home. This process of moving several times within a 
single year, or even two years, can increase household and community recovery time, alongside 
increased distress during the recovery process (Merdjanoff, 2013). The more times a household 
has to move, the less time they are able to focus their time and energy on reestablishing their 
everyday routine thereby reaching recovery.  
Location 
The location of the unit has a direct effect on a household’s ability to recover post-
disaster because this dictates the access that household will have to employment, childcare, and 
other essential needs. Some temporary housing units have been developed for specific locations 
to assist with recovery, for example, a household’s pre-disaster property, but some 
accommodations do not take the ease of access to a household’s everyday needs into 
consideration. Accessibility issues have been made apparent particularly for manufactured 
homes and hotels. Manufactured housing units can be placed on the household’s pre-disaster 
property or on a newly developed or existing group site where this group site may be in or 
outside of the disaster-stricken community. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the recovery setback 
experienced from using group sites that are far outside of the household’s pre-disaster 
community (Verderber, 2008). Group sites were used after Hurricane Katrina when private 
property was not available. These group sites heavily affected the transition to permanent 
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housing, especially if the site was isolated from the community and convenient public 
transportation making everyday tasks, such as grocery shopping, laundry, and commuting to 
work and school almost impossible (Smith, 2017). Levine et al. (2007) reported one post-Katrina 
group site was set up in a trailer park in Baker, Louisiana, 91 miles northwest of New Orleans. 
The site was set up with sewer services, for example, but was completely inaccessible to basic 
needs due to a lack of transportation made available to the residents (Levine et al., 2007). This 
remoteness left victims feeling helpless and, in some cases, cost recovery agency employees and 
volunteer’s money out of pocket to get residents’ basic needs met. In a survey of 47 trailer parks 
throughout southern Louisiana and Mississippi, only 42% of victims were in close proximity to 
their original homes (Verderber, 2008), which greatly hindered the ability of residents to return 
to the city for jobs, schooling and to assist other family members. If manufactured homes were 
placed on pre-disaster properties, the households were able to begin their damaged home repair 
process with ease of access to the home. Private-property installation also made it possible to 
return to the city, one's job, and family (Verderber, 2008). 
In addition to MHUs, hotels have been used as a common type of temporary housing. 
Recent details of their shortcomings have been observed following the August 2016 floods in 
southern Louisiana. Hotels accept FEMA temporary housing vouchers on a voluntary basis. 
Therefore, the location of voucher-accepting hotels was not always ideal for displaced 
households (Hardman, 2016). Similar to group MHU sites positioned far away from the city, 
hotels positioned far away create travel problems (Weiss, 2016), including difficulty in accessing 
work, school, laundry services, and food (Hardman, 2016). Weiss (2016) shares a story of a 
mother and her two sons from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, who were asked to check out of their 
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hotel in Baton Rouge. Unfortunately, the closest available hotel was in Houma, Louisiana, 87 
miles south, drastically changing their daily commute times (Weiss, 2016). 
When a temporary housing accommodation is located far away, it increases the day-to-
day stress experienced by the household. Fortunately, not all temporary housing 
accommodations need to be positioned far away. As previously stated, the RAPIDO units were 
created specifically for a community. RAPIDO units were installed and expanded on the 
household’s pre-disaster property, or if a household preferred to move out of the floodplain, the 
program mandated that the unit still be positioned in the community in order to maintain the 
togetherness of the household with other community members (Zandt and Womeldurf, 2017). 
The RAPIDO program focused on keeping residents on their property and in the community to 
help fulfill their everyday needs while building their community back together (Morales-Diaz, 
2016). Similarly, Katrina Cottages were designed to be placed on the household’s pre-disaster 
property and can be left as permanent housing if desired (Levine et al., 2007). Also, similarly, 
FEMA’s Multi-Family Lease and Repair program mandated contracts with properties within 
“reasonable access”, e.g., a distance which does not place an undue burden on an applicant to 
community services such as schools, fire and emergency services, or grocery stores (FEMA, 
2013). Most of the newly developed temporary housing programs have taken location into 
consideration, but with options like hotels and manufactured housing units, some issues still arise 
that can create a difficult recovery path for households residing in those particular units. 
Economic Recovery and Creating Jobs 
The location of the temporary housing unit goes hand in hand with the economic 
recovery of individual household and the community as a whole. The economy of a community 
can recover faster if their residents are able to stay within their borders keeping funds circulating 
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within rather than circulating in an outside, and otherwise non-recovering community. Utilizing 
temporary housing accommodations that can keep residents in the community, such as placing 
units on pre-disaster property, help with that economic recovery (Verderber, 2008).  
The developers of the RAPIDO program worked closely with the residents of the targeted 
neighborhoods to ensure that not only their everyday needs were being met with the design of the 
unit, but also to ensure that the local economy was stimulated. In order to do this, residents 
participated in the rebuilding process. Having the residents involved kept the community 
together, while allowing them to earn income, either through their previous jobs or through 
participating in the RAPIDO construction if the disaster left them unemployed. Residents were 
employed as transporters and builders with both skilled and unskilled labor to slowly restore the 
local construction economy. Purchasing materials from local suppliers also kept funds circulating 
in the community. Having community programs and procedures in place such as RAPIDO 
allows for the funds generally spent on federal administration and implementation to be used for 
community recovery by putting the funds back into the residents’ pockets (Morales-Diaz, 2016). 
Both the Multi-Family Lease and Repair, and the Shelter at Home programs allowed for 
employment of local contractors and construction workers. Since these programs are geared 
towards repairs to properties, rather than prefabricated, factory-built units, local skilled workers 
who likely are disaster victims as well, have some sort of income to help with their individual 
recovery. Kaufmann (2017) reports the experience of one property owner in Baton Rouge, LA 
whose home repairs were expedited by a 70% improvement in completion time (relative to if he 





A major social consequence following disasters is the widespread impact on physical and 
mental health. While this is often a result of initial physical damage, specific temporary housing 
accommodations have initiated or exacerbated health conditions. After Hurricane Katrina, many 
victims residing in manufactured homes experienced decreasing well-being, and mental and 
physical health problems (Duara, 2008; Verderber, 2008; McIntosh et al., 2009; 2012). In a 
survey of 47 trailer parks throughout southern Louisiana and Mississippi, 21% confirmed no type 
of security available on the grounds at night leading to 49% not feeling safe to walk outside after 
dark. Even during the daylight hours, 45% did not feel comfortable allowing their children to 
play outside during the day (Verderber 2008). These obstacles faced in group sites hindered the 
well-being and comfort of the victims, especially the children.  
The mental health of FEMA-issued MHU residents were of large concern in the months 
following Hurricane Katrina as found in a study by Verderber (2008). Victims in all phases of 
life were affected: children, adults, and the elderly. Domestic violence, divorce rate, depression, 
anxiety, sleep disorders, hypervigilance, flashbacks, and suicide rates were all observed to 
increase after living in a MHU. The mental health of children living in MHUs seemed to 
deteriorate as well: regressive behaviors, nightmares, increased aggression to others and to one’s 
self, social withdrawal and isolation, nutrition decline, and fear of darkness. In the aged, sleep 
disorders, memory loss, and disorientation increased were all observed through the study. Loss 
of appetite, overeating, and a lack of concentration was also observed in the elderly community. 
Of all the victims included in the Verderber (2008) study, 50% of MHU residents met criteria for 
major depressive disorder with 15 times as many suicides and 70 times as many suicide attempts 
than the Louisiana state average.  
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Households residing in hotels experienced similar mental health impacts as those residing 
in the FEMA-issued MHUs. Again, using the August 2016 south Louisiana floods as an 
example, over 750 households were still staying in hotels waiting for the next steps six months 
after the storm (Hardy, 2017b). With households having to stay in hotels for so long, mental 
health issues begin to arise. Children staying in hotels were having a hard time adjusting to living 
in only one room as opposed to a house; anxiety in children was observed to increase because 
they could not process their current living situation (Hardman, 2016). 
A study performed by Abramson et al. (2015) explored the physical health conditions of 
victims after Hurricane Sandy. The victims of Hurricane Sandy included in this survey are 
households that remained in their damaged home because no other option was available to them. 
The study included visiting and interviewing a random sample of 1000 people that were residing 
in one of the nine New Jersey counties affected by Sandy. Poorer physical health and lower 
mental health was found in lower income households which was directly attributed to staying in 
damaged homes. Mold growth was very common in damaged homes; those exposed to mold 
were 2.5 times more likely to develop asthma and 2 times more likely to experience mental 
health distress than those not exposed (Soo, 2015).  
Units such as the RAPIDO programs and Katrina Cottages sought to relieve some of the 
stress and mental hardships on disaster victims and develop units that had a more “home” feeling 
and that also allowed for them to continue every-day activities such as having friends and family 
over (ABT Associates, Inc., 2009). RAPIDO units tried to implement the local culture in their 
design to ensure the residents still felt connected to their homes and felt like they could resume 
their lifestyle and did not feel that their living situation was causing unneeded and unwanted 
stress (Morales-Diaz, 2016). 
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Customizability 
The ability to customize a temporary housing unit and make it feel like a home had a 
direct relationship to the well-being of occupants. For example, interior and exterior walls cannot 
be painted, and locations and layouts cannot be specified in FEMA-issued manufactured housing 
units. Residents can face legal charges if they try to change any part of the MHU (Verderber 
2008). In 2006, one year after Hurricane Katrina, a lawsuit was filed stating that the MHUs and 
the group sites that a number of them were located in were “unsafe and presenting a clear and 
present danger to the health and well-being of plaintiffs and their families” (Brunker 2006). 
Other temporary housing programs and units such as the RAPIDO and Katrina Cottages sought 
to make the units as customizable as possible by allowing the household to feel like they had 
some type of control over the unit they were given.  
During the implementation of the RAPIDO program, households met one on one with 
designers to select a floorplan that best meet their needs and lifestyles. These selections included 
the number of bedrooms, and location of the unit, either back onto the pre-disaster property or 
another property out of the flood plain (Morales-Diaz, 2016). RAPIDO wanted to ensure that 
these units could be modified to fit cultural, lifestyle, and environmental factors (Zandt and 
Womeldurf, 2017). Katrina Cottages also geared their units towards customizability. Designer of 
the Katrina Cottages, Marianne Cusato believed that it was important to give households an 
attractive place to live with the desired permanency needed to feel comfortable to return back to 
a normal life (Cusato, 2018). To achieve this, several variations of the cottage were developed 





With all the different types of temporary housing units, financial cost becomes a driving 
factor. Depending on the situation, government agencies such as FEMA and HUD provide funds 
for temporary housing units, and in other cases, insurance companies may help with finances, or 
even the individual household takes care of the cost of the unit. This depends on the financial 
assistance programs, and if the household applies and is approved for assistance. The financial 
cost of the units can be dependent on the location of the unit, the size of the unit, or the duration 
of stay in the unit. At the time of the August 2016 floods in south Louisiana, the cost of installing 
a FEMA mobile unit on private property was reported as $129,000: $62,500 upfront cost for 
mobile home; $23,000 for installation; $15,400 for maintenance; $5,000 for transportation; and 
$23,000 for administrative overhead cost (Allen, 2016). The total cost for installation in a pre-
existing commercial mobile home park was $149,000 (Allen, 2016). For the same disaster, as of 
May 31, 2017, which is about nine months after the event, FEMA had paid approximately $42 
million in hotel stays which averaged to $103 per night per room (Jones, 2017). If assuming an 
18-month temporary housing phase, this nightly average amounts to approximately $55,600, 
which is approximately 43% cheaper than a pre-disaster property FEMA-issued manufactured 
home.  
The “Shelter at Home Program” makes temporary repairs to homes if it can be made 
livable for under $15,000 with the state’s approval. FEMA funds these temporary repairs leaving 
the homeowners to fund more permanent repairs. Although the cap is $15,000 when this program 
was implemented in Louisiana after the 2016 floods, the average for repairs was $10,500 per 
home (Crisp, 2017). It is stated in the Multi-Family Lease and Repair program outline by FEMA 
and the US Department of Homeland Security that FEMA shall determine the “value of the lease 
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agreement” by multiplying the monthly fair market rent by the number of units, and then 
multiplying by the number of months remaining between the date the repairs are completed and 
the end of the 18 month period of assistance (FEMA, 2013). For example, if this program is 
implemented in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, the fair market rent for East Baton Rouge Parish for 
two-bedrooms is $906 (HUD User, 2018), and the full 18 months of temporary housing are 
needed, the total cost, per household would be about $16,300.   
The RAPIDO program, as well as the Katrina Cottages wanted units that would not cause 
as much of a heavy finance burden as the manufactured units. An estimated cost for a RAPIDO 
three-bedroom expansion is $69,000 (Simone, 2015). A Katrina Cottage can generally be 
delivered for approximately $70,000 which includes construction (Katrina Cottage, 2006). Many 
of these alternative housing units are significantly less in financial cost than the estimated 
amount for manufactured housing units.  
Structural Design Level 
One of the most important qualities of temporary housing units is the structural design 
level of the unit. Some issues were seen with manufactured housing units at the time of 
Hurricane Katrina. The units, proved to be unsustainable since they were only designed to 
withstand 40 mph (Verderber, 2008). Although this meets FEMA’s minimum requirement, it 
falls much shorter than ASCE 7 (2005) and HUD’s Manufactured Home Construction and Safety 
Standards (1994) wind loads. Thus, the structures put occupants at risk to high winds, making 
them susceptible to future disasters. This was especially concerning since many residents stayed 
in these units for six more hurricane seasons. Since the demand for temporary housing was so 
high in the aftermath of Katrina, the travel trailer units distributed to victims were built using the 
least expensive materials and methods that were the most readily available which included steel 
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framing, foam-insulated panels, and manufactured wood interiors (McIntosh, 2008). They were 
constructed very quickly to meet the high demand, but the expedient construction backfired 
when a number of units were found to be unhealthy for residency and not sustainable (McIntosh 
et al., 2009).  
Structural design level is another quality where Katrina Cottages and RAPIDO units 
shined by designing their units to be more resistant against higher winds. The creators of the 
Katrina Cottage wanted to develop a unit that was sustainable to prevent damage from future 
storms, with the regional and community culture, condition, and climate, while avoiding the 
issues with past temporary housing options (McIntosh et al., 2009). This was done by designing 
the units to withstand winds up to 150 mph and built with hurricane resistant materials (Katrina 
Cottage, 2006). Taking the design one step further, all plans available were reviewed by a 
professional engineer, and moving forward, should be reviewed by a local professional to make 
sure the design meets local installation requirements (Cusato, 2018). RAPIDO units were also 
built to use readily available and standardized materials in an intuitive design that can quickly by 
built by unskilled labor and can be replicated at various scales (Morales-Diaz, 2016). After the 
additions to the CORE were completed, the families had a permanent home that surpassed the 
structural integrity and safety of their pre-disaster home, thus preparing for future disasters. 
Residents had the decision to install the CORE on their pre-disaster property or relocate out of 
the flood plain to a different location. Homes located in the flood plain were elevated 1.5 to 2 
feet above the ground to setback future flooding and damage (Zandt and Womeldurf, 2017). 
Elevated homes were strapped down and raised on piers along with a simple foundation system. 
Keeping residents on their property through both temporary and permanent housing phases 
avoided long spans of displacement and ease of overall community recovery. These households 
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were able to fulfill their everyday needs while building their community back together (Morales-
Diaz, 2016).  
Table 1 summarizes the seven themes extracted through the content-analysis presented 
above on post-disaster temporary housing. The information in table 2 is used to suggest an 
optimal temporary housing unit for a particular household based on their needs and preferences 
in post-disaster recovery.  
   Table 2. Household Experiences in Temporary Housing 
Temporary 




These essential emergency cleanup and minor repairs 
help households get a jumpstart on their full recovery 
and live in at least a portion of their home, while they 
continue to finish the big task of making permanent 









Government officials would like the community to be 
able to come back to a restored house rather than 










Applicant eligibility requires the signing and abiding 
by a FEMA Temporary Housing Agreement which 
includes a realistic permanent housing plan (PHP) and 
requires regular meetings with FEMA representatives 








Consists of a temporary housing “CORE” that families 
move into a disaster that can be expanded to create 


















Two and three bedroom have a removable 
undercarriages in order to be placed on permanent 









Group sites inaccessible or isolated from other 
community sectors made everyday tasks (grocery 
shopping, laundry, and commuting to work and school) 
almost impossible 
Location Smith, 2017 
Manufactured 
housing units 
One group site was located in Baker, Louisiana 91 
miles northwest of New Orleans after Katrina 
Location Levine et 
al., 2007 
Hotels Staying in hotels significant distances away from home 
created severe travel problems 
Location Weiss, 
2016 
Hotels Issues arose with getting to work and getting children 
to school, but also smaller inconveniences such as 







The property must be within reasonable access (A 
distance which does not place an undue burden on an 
applicant) to community services such as schools, fire 






Can be placed in the household's pre-disaster property 
and can be left after reconstruction 




The close proximity to permanent residence allow for 
repairs to begin on the damaged home and also make it 








Keeping residents on their property and in the 
community help fulfill their everyday needs while 








Purchasing materials from local suppliers also kept 







RAPIDO allows for funds generally spent on federal 
administration and implementation to be used for 










Expedites completion time for multi-family housing 
owners by about 70% 




Residents can be employed as transporters and builders 
with both skilled and unskilled labor to slowly restore 





Domestic violence, divorce rate, depression, anxiety, 
sleep disorders, hypervigilance, flashbacks, and suicide 
rates were all observed to increase 




Children showed signs of regressive behaviors, 
nightmares, increased aggression, social withdrawal 
and isolation, nutrition decline, and fear of darkness. 




Elderly experienced sleep disorders, memory loss, 
disorientation, loss of appetite, overeating, and inability 
to concentrate 




50% of group site residents met criteria for major 
depressive disorder 




15 times as many suicides and 70 times as many 
suicide attempts than the Louisiana state average from 
those living in group sites 




47 out of 50 group sites parks in Louisiana and 
Mississippi participated in a survey: 21% confirmed no 
type of security on the grounds at night 




47 out of 50 group sites in Louisiana and Mississippi 
participated in a survey: 49% did not feel safe to walk 
outside at night 




47 out of 50 group sites in Louisiana and Mississippi 
participated in a survey: 45% did not feel safe to allow 
children to play outside during the day  
Health impacts Verderber, 
2008 
Hotels Children staying in hotels were having a hard time 
adjusting to living in only a room as opposed to a house 
Health impacts Hardman, 
2016 
Hotels Anxiety in children was increasing because they could 
not understand the reason of their current living 
situation 




If exposed to mold two times more likely to develop 
moderate to severe mental health distress 
Health impacts Abramson 
et al., 2015 
Damaged 
Home 
15% of residents had asthma during time of survey for 
Hurricane Sandy and 19% of them were diagnosed 
after the storm 
Health impacts Abramson 




Some toxins in damaged homes had “double-barreled 
effects”- exposure to mold was associated with both 
clinically-diagnosed asthma and with mental health 
distress 
Health impacts Abramson 
et al., 2015 
Katrina 
Cottage 
Mental health was preserved with the cottages "feeling 
more like home" as well as being able to continue 
every-day activities such as having friends and family 
over 





Interior and exterior walls could not be painted; 





Residents could face legal charges if they tried to 





Households meet one on one with designers to select a 





Residents can install the CORE on pre-disaster 














several variations of the cottage were made with 
different architects and designers in different locations 





Katrina Cottages developed into the design of various 
options 




The cost of installing a FEMA mobile unit on private 
property was reported as $129,000: $62,500 upfront 
cost for mobile home; $23,000 for installation; $15,400 
for maintenance; $5,000 for transportation; and 
$23,000 for administrative overhead cost  
Financial cost Allen, 2016 
Manufactured 
housing units 
Cost estimates in a pre-existing commercial park for 
mobile homes- $149,000 
Financial cost Allen, 2016 
Hotels As of May 31, 2017, FEMA had paid approximately 
$42 million in hotel stays which averaged to $103 per 
night per room 




If a home could be made livable for under $15,000 with 
the state’s approval, then FEMA would fund these 
temporary repairs leaving the homeowners to fund 
more permanent repairs 





FEMA shall determine the "value of the lease 
agreement" by multiplying the monthly Fair Market 
Rent by the number of units, and then multiplying the 
number of months remaining between the date the 
repairs are completed and the end of the 18-month 
period of assistance 








including construction, Katrina Cottages can be 
delivered for approximately $70,000  





Built using least expensive materials and methods that 
are the most readily available; constructed very quickly 
to meet demand; backfired when found to be unhealthy 









At the time of Katrina, designed to only withstand 40 















RAPIDO The purpose was to develop an intuitive design that 
uses readily available and standardized materials, is 
able to be quickly built by unskilled labor, and can be 





RAPIDO Home is designed to construction standards that make 





RAPIDO In most cases the units are going back on pre-disaster 
property, so any homes that are in the flood plain can 
be elevated 1.5 to 2 feet off the ground to keep water 








Built to withstand the remainder of hurricane season 















All plans have been reviewed by a professional 
engineer, but should be reviewed by a local 








The idea was to create something that was sustainable 
to prevent damage from future storms, with the 
regional and community culture, condition, and 








The literature also presented another vital topic that highlights ongoing issues with 
temporary housing. Disparities in timing, quality, and location of temporary housing have been 
observed after the past decade of disasters (Sutley and Hamideh, 2017). The specific needs of 
socially vulnerable households are often overlooked in the existing recovery programs: most live 
in hazard prone areas, have lower quality housing construction, live in poorly built 
neighborhoods, are renters (and therefore have less control over dislocation decisions, as well as 
not applicable for recovery funds), have lower incomes, savings, and often do not have 
insurance, thus further hindering households’ abilities to recover (Quarantelli, 1995; Sutley and 
Hamideh, 2017). To receive certain types of aid after a disaster, specific criteria must be met, and 
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losses must be proven. Oftentimes, low income, and racial and ethnic minority households do not 
have enough possessions pre-disaster to demonstrate substantial loss caused by the disaster or the 
required paperwork demonstrating ownership of their home, thus those with higher property 
values receive more aid by proving greater losses (Van Zandt and Sloan, 2017). Vulnerable 
populations, specifically low-income households, who experience issues receiving financial aid 
recover slower as a direct result (Bolin, 1991; Kamel and Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004).  
The 1994 Northridge earthquake in Los Angeles, California brought one of the first true 
realizations of recovery issues within a community stemming from inequalities in distribution of 
temporary housing. Slower recovery rates were observed for socially vulnerable, or otherwise 
marginalized, households (Comerio, 2006). The temporary housing programs were observed to 
produce varying recovery processes and rates based on household characteristics such as race, 
ethnicity, income, tenure status, and residency situation (Kamel and Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004). Of 
all the units damaged in the Northridge earthquake, 60,000 were severely damaged which 
consisted mostly of apartment buildings (Comerio, 1997). Although a significant number of the 
damaged units were multi-family housing, only 16% of funding went to those units while 59% of 
funding went to single family home owners (Kamel and Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004).  
The RAPIDO program was developed for Brownsville, Texas, one of the most heavily 
impacted cities by both Hurricanes Dolly and Ike in 2008. The program’s goal was to aid 
specific neighborhoods, colonias that were concentrated with low-income, Hispanic- and 
Mexican-Americans residing in significantly underdeveloped homes. After Hurricanes Dolly and 
Ike, these households were forced to reside in their damaged and molded home because no 
funding or housing assistance was available to them due to deferred maintenance (Binkovitz, 
2016). The RAPIDO program was developed to help these vulnerable households because the 
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resilience of a community can be undermined when different segments of the population recover 
at different rates, some are left behind while others return to pre-storm conditions or even leap 
ahead (Zandt and Sloan, 2017).  
Hurricane Sandy presented alarming statistics regarding low income populations. In the 
same study by Abramson et al. (2015) discussed previously, it was found that those with lower 
income have the greatest assistance needs, but those with higher income are more likely to apply 
for assistance. Poorer health was found in households after the storm with income less than 
$20,000 when race, age, and gender were controlled. In addition, those households in the low-
income bracket experienced lower mental health after the storm.  
The south Louisiana August 2016 floods presented information on how renters and other 
vulnerable populations were treated with respect to temporary housing programs. Renters were 
put in a tough position after disasters because more often than not, landlords make decisions for 
their rental properties, meaning occupants are often not consulted for their opinions although the 
decisions affect them directly and leave them without a form of housing (Van Zandt & 
Womeldurf, 2017). Six months after the flooding a state total of 750 households, most of whom 
were pre-disaster renters, were still in hotels waiting the next phase of house (Hardy, 2017b). 
Those still using assistance 9 months after the storm are households headed by elderly, low-
income families that were struggling to make ends meet pre-disaster, and those without insurance 
(Jones, 2017).  
Table 3 summarizes these important observations on post-disaster temporary housing 




   Table 3. Vulnerable Populations in Temporary Housing 
Disaster, Year Information Source 
Consistently 




Differences in social classes govern the differences in acceptability 
of mobile homes as temporary housing 
Quarantelli, 
1995 




Multi-family dwellings are often not a priority post-disaster which 





Multi-family and rental households have a harder time receiving 
necessary aid typically because these groups of people tend to 




Communities isolated from society have a harder time recovering 




Those that are considered to be marginalized in some type of way 
from what a "normal" life looks like tend to be the ones receiving 
less aid, suffer more losses, having longer recovery time, and having 




Some examples of those marginalized groups, classified as more 
vulnerable: live in hazard prone areas, lower quality construction, 




For multifamily housing owners to receive aid for their properties, 
business profitability had to be proven which is exceptionally hard to 




Higher value homes and property showed higher losses because of 




Those with lower value property and contents could not demonstrate 






Those who lived in mobile homes prior to the flood have no location 
for a new mobile home because the site was destroyed, and local 




and Ike, 2008 
 
85% of applicants from impoverished communities were denied 
financial assistance because of "deferred maintenance" meaning 
homes were not up to code prior to the storm, so it was hard to 
distinguish between hurricane damage and the pre-disaster condition  
Binkovitz, 
2016 
When different segments of the population recover at different rates, 
some are left behind while others return to pre-storm conditions or 
even leap ahead, the resilience of a community can be undermined 
Van Zandt & 
Sloan, 2017 
Neighborhoods that are home to socially vulnerable populations are 
likely to experience the greatest needs in post-disaster recovery.  
Van Zandt & 
Sloan, 2017 
Many households were living in molded and damaged homes post-






Those with lower income have the greatest assistance needs, but 
those with higher income are more likely to apply for assistance 
Abramson et 
al., 2015 
Poorer health was found in households after the storm with income 
less than $20,000 when race, age, and gender is controlled 
Abramson et 
al., 2015 









headed by elderly or low-income families that were struggling to 
make ends meet pre-disaster and those without insurance 
Six months after the flooding a state total of 750 households, most of 
whom were pre-disaster renters, were still in hotels waiting the next 
phase of house 
Hardy, 2017b 
Landlords make decisions for rental properties, meaning renters are 
often not consulted for their opinions although the decisions affect 
them directly 





CHAPTER IV. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In an effort to close the gap on disparities in temporary housing and to ensure victims of 
disasters have a temporary housing accommodation that helps their recovery, rather than hurts, a 
new approach for selecting temporary housing units based on household needs and preferences 
was developed and is presented here. The approach seeks to incorporate the common themes 
extracted from the content-analysis and includes two interconnected loops, one at the household-
level and one at the community-level as shown in figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Temporary Housing Evaluation Framework 
First, the proposed approach at the household level, shown in figure 5, includes a new 
integrated sustainability and resilience evaluation model that is applied to the existing types of 
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temporary housing units to recommend an optimal temporary housing solution based on the 
disaster, household, and the types of units available. The model is designed to take into account 
the individual household’s needs and preferences.  
 
Figure 5. Temporary Housing Evaluation Household-Level Framework 
The first input is a disaster scenario that defines the type of hazard and the level of 
damage to the pre-disaster home. The type of hazard is crucial to understanding what types of 
damage should be expected. For example, hurricanes and earthquakes have widespan damage 
impacting entire cities or coastlines, while tornadoes create more localized damage. This helps in 
anticipating the amount of people who would be in need of temporary housing options and how 
versatile the units must be to accommodate a large number. The type of hazard also dictates the 
types of dislocation that can be expected. Hurricanes can be predicted to a certain extent 
allowing households to evacuate prior to the storm in most cases, while residents are most likely 
in buildings and in the middle of the hazard for earthquakes and tornadoes. The severity of 
damage is also a dislocation time estimator. The more damage, the longer the household will be 
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displaced due to longer repair times, and the lower damage the quicker the household can get 
back into their homes.  
Second, the household description details the particular household being considered, 
including their household size and structure, (i.e., how many people live in the home, whether 
there are children), economic status, employment stability, and insurance coverage. These 
characteristics can lead to households having different needs and preferences in temporary 
housing accommodations based on their pre-disaster status. Some households may need larger 
units based on household size. Some may need assistance with only minor repairs, while others 
may need assistance that will provide them a more permanent solution depending on their 
insurance coverage and financial stability. One other specification in the household description is 
their tenure status. This specifies whether the household owned a home or rented a property, in 
which case their needs in temporary housing accommodations would vary. This input also 
specifies the structural reliability of their pre-disaster home if the home was owned by the 
household. The structural reliability of the home can be classified as either structurally sound or 
structurally deficient. Structurally sound means that the building complies with current or more 
recent building codes, therefore predicted to sustain less damage. Structurally deficient homes 
are assumed to be made with outdated codes or no codes at all, therefore sustaining much larger 
amounts of damage. These qualities and descriptions of households can distinguish which 
households may be considered marginalized and need more assistance in certain aspects in post-
disaster recovery from the underlying pre-disaster social vulnerability.  
Third, the types of temporary housing to be evaluated are input. This can include any 
type of temporary housing unit, for example, manufactured homes, custom built cottages and 
housing units, and other federally and privately funded programs. Temporary housing 
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accommodations that have been found throughout the literature include programs that have been 
developed by FEMA (i.e., Shelter at Home and Multi-Family Lease and Repair programs), other 
accommodations provided by FEMA (i.e., manufactured housing units and hotel stays), privately 
developed programs and units such as RAPIDO and Katrina Cottages, and even staying in a 
damaged home if no other options are available. In order to evaluate the temporary housing 
options accurately, enough information must be available to assess the units on each of the 
sustainability and resilience qualities.  
All three input categories feed into the integrated evaluation model which is comprised of 
two parts: first, the evaluation of temporary housing units using qualities, and second, 
determining the overall quality of life of a household residing in a particular unit. The first step 
of the evaluation model includes eight different qualities of temporary housing units. The 
qualities are shown in figure 6 fall under resilience, sustainability, or both. While there are a 
number of other qualities and important details that could also be used for assessment, the ones 
selected here best reflect the common themes found from the content-analysis of the literature 
presented in Chapter 3. Some themes encompass multiple qualities, and some qualities combine 
more than one theme, but overall the recurring positive and negative experiences that have been 
recorded and found in the literature across all types of post-disaster temporary housing are shown 
through these particular qualities. Transition to permanent housing is implemented as 
adaptability, meaning how adaptable the structure is. Economic recovery, location, and creation 
of jobs all feed into population stability. Structural design level breaks down into two qualities, 
namely, structural integrity and hazard vulnerability. Health impacts, customizability, and 
financial cost are all mirrored in these qualities. The following sections provide the quantitative 
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formulation for each quality. These formulations are based on specific measurement criteria 
derived from theoretically-based definitions of the characteristic.  
 
Figure 6. Temporary Housing Qualities 
Adaptability 
The adaptability, 𝐴𝐴(𝑗𝑗), of a temporary housing unit 𝑗𝑗 is defined in two different ways, 
with respect to the unit itself, and with respect to the associated program. With respect to the 
temporary housing unit, adaptability is the ability to transition into permanent housing without 
having to move into another unit. On the temporary housing program level, adaptability can also 
mean that the program requires a permanent housing solution before moving into the temporary 
housing unit. Here, adaptability is measured as a binary quality: the temporary housing 
accommodation is either adaptable (1), or not (0), expressed as 
𝐴𝐴(𝑗𝑗) = �0    𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1            𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎                   (1) 
Customizability  
The customizability, 𝐶𝐶(𝑗𝑗), of a temporary housing unit 𝑗𝑗 accounts for the number of 
features that a household can choose or change in order to fit their specific needs. Here, 
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customizability is measured with three possibilities, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖: customizable interior or exterior 
appearance and decor, customizable layout or size of the temporary housing unit, and the ability 
to choose the geographic location of the temporary housing unit. Customizability is measured on 
a scale of 0 to 3 depending on how many customizable features the unit provides, expressed as  
𝐶𝐶(𝑗𝑗) = ∑ (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)3𝑖𝑖=0                        (2) 
Population Stability 
Population stability, 𝑃𝑃(𝑗𝑗), measures the ability to keep the local economy stimulated after 
the disaster by keeping the household inside the community. In this study, population stability 
consists of two scenarios, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖: (1) the location of the temporary home allows for a circulation of 
funds within the disaster-stricken community helping to build the economy back; and (2) the 
temporary housing program creates jobs for those who may be out of work post-disaster. 𝑃𝑃(𝑗𝑗) is 
measured on a scale of 0 to 2 depending on how the temporary housing unit can stimulate the 
local economy, expressed as 
𝑃𝑃(𝑗𝑗) = ∑ (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)2𝑖𝑖=0                             (3) 
Environmental Impacts 
Environmental impacts, 𝐸𝐸(𝑗𝑗), are measured here as greenhouse gas emissions for each 
type of temporary housing 𝑗𝑗. The total emissions seen during the lifetime of the building is the 
summation of the greenhouse gas emitted during each of the four life cycle phases, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖: 
production, construction, use, and end of life, expressed as  
𝐸𝐸(𝑗𝑗) = ∑ (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)4𝑖𝑖=0       (4) 
To measure 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 or 𝐸𝐸(𝑗𝑗), life cycle assessment (LCA) can be performed using a commercially 
available software, such as ATHENA Impact Estimator for Buildings (ATHENA, 2017).  
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Health Impacts 
Health impacts, 𝐻𝐻(𝑗𝑗), account for potential mental and physical health impacts caused by 
residing in a temporary housing type 𝑗𝑗. Mental health impacts could include depression, anxiety, 
sleep disorders, hyper-vigilance, suicide accounts and attempts, regressive behaviors, social 
withdrawal and isolation, memory loss, disorientation, and lack of concentration (Verderber, 
2008). Physical health impacts could include domestic violence, headaches, nausea, vomiting, 
asthma diagnosis, and respiratory issues (Verderber, 2008). 𝐻𝐻(𝑗𝑗) is measured as a binary 
variable: (0) if reports are available on health issues stimulated from residing in the particular 
type of temporary housing; (1) if no health issues were previously documented, expressed as 
𝐻𝐻(𝑗𝑗) = �0                    ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒 ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛ℎ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖1                      𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒 ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛ℎ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖                (5) 
Financial Cost 
Financial cost, 𝐹𝐹(𝑗𝑗), is estimated here as the dollar price required to fabricate, transport, 
and install the temporary housing unit or accommodation. The total cost of the unit can include 
any combination of the fabrication, transportation, and installation phases, 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖, that are applicable 
to the unit or accommodation in question, therefore 𝐹𝐹(𝑗𝑗) can be expressed as 
 𝐹𝐹(𝑗𝑗) = ∑ (𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖)3𝑖𝑖=0       (6) 
Structural Integrity 
Structural integrity, 𝑆𝑆(𝑗𝑗), is defined here as the ability of the temporary housing unit to 
meet full service load and functionality requirements. Damage states categorize physical damage 
into five levels (0 to 4), namely no damage, minor damage, moderate damage, severe damage, 
and complete damage, respectively. Table 4 provides brief, general descriptions of typical 
occupancy statuses and repairs required to buildings at each of these damage states.  
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Table 4. Damage States and Descriptions 
Damage State Description 
0 None Building is safe for continued occupancy; no repairs required. 
1 Minor Building is safe for continued occupancy; minor repairs required. 
2 Moderate Shelter-in-place allowed; moderate repair and replacement required. 
3 Severe Shelter-in-place prohibited; structural damage or other life-threatening hazards incurred. 
4 Complete Building is not safe for entry and must be reconstructed. 
 
Values between 0 and 3 are assigned to each temporary housing 𝑗𝑗 based on its damage 
state during occupancy, assuming that no one could still live in a damage state 4. In most cases, 
𝑆𝑆(𝑗𝑗) equals zero. When a household decides to shelter in place in their damaged residence 
instead of dislocating, 𝑆𝑆(𝑗𝑗) exceeds zero, expressed as 
𝑆𝑆(𝑗𝑗) = �
0                  𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎
1           𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎
2    𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎
3          𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎
                             (7) 
The probability that a particular damage state will occur is conditioned on a hazard intensity 
measure (e.g., wind speed for wind hazards; spectral acceleration for seismic). Building 
performance curves provide the probability of not reaching or exceeding a particular damage 
state given a certain value of the hazard intensity measure (IM), expressed as. Therefore, the 
probability of not exceeding (PNE) a specific damage state, DS, can be expressed as  
𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸 = 𝑃𝑃[𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 ≤ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖|𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀 = 𝑖𝑖]      (8) 
 The non-exceedance probability expressed in Eq. (8) is referred to as a building performance 
curve, which are determined through numerical simulations performed on building models to 
develop a relationship between the appropriate hazard intensity measure (and appropriate range) 





Hazard vulnerability, 𝑉𝑉(𝑗𝑗), is defined here as the ability of the temporary housing unit to 
withstand future disasters. Temporary housing has a FEMA-specified duration of 18 months, but 
in many cases, it exceeds this time meaning that households may have to endure additional 
disaster seasons in a temporary housing unit, or additional disasters in the same season 
(McIntosh, 2008; Muskal, 2012). Building performance curves used for structural integrity can 
also be used for measuring hazard vulnerability. Using equation 8, the 50th percentile hazard 
intensity measure at each damage state is recorded for measuring hazard vulnerability. The 
temporary housing type with the highest 50th percentile IM for a particular damage state has the 
lowest hazard vulnerability. This means that the unit can experience a greater IM before that 
particular level of damage is reached. The 50th percentile IMs, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖, for each temporary housing 
unit, 𝑗𝑗, from building performance curves are normalized with respect to the maximum 50th 






          (9) 
 
The normalization step is added here to capture how each of the units at a particular damage state 
perform in comparison to the maximum performing unit at that damage state.  The normalized 
values are summed across damage states for each temporary housing j to determine the hazard 
vulnerability score, 𝑉𝑉(𝑗𝑗), expressed as 
𝑉𝑉(𝑗𝑗) =  ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)4𝑖𝑖=1            (10) 
 
Quality of Life Index 
The quality of life index, 𝑄𝑄(𝑗𝑗), measures the overall potential well-being of a household 
residing in a particular temporary housing unit 𝑗𝑗 based on their self-identified needs. To 
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formulate the quality of life index, the values of each quality for each type of temporary housing 
unit are summed. Depending on the pre- and post-disaster situation, households may value some 
qualities higher than others, thus weights, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖, are applied to each quality measure to account for 
household preference, expressed as 
𝑄𝑄(𝑗𝑗) = �(𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖)
8
𝑖𝑖=1
= 𝑙𝑙1 ∗ 𝐴𝐴(𝑗𝑗) + 𝑙𝑙2 ∗ 𝐶𝐶(𝑗𝑗) + 𝑙𝑙3 ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝑗𝑗) + 𝑙𝑙4 ∗ 𝐸𝐸(𝑗𝑗) + 𝑙𝑙5 ∗ 𝐻𝐻(𝑗𝑗) 
+𝑙𝑙6 ∗ 𝐹𝐹(𝑗𝑗) + 𝑙𝑙7 ∗ 𝑆𝑆(𝑗𝑗) + 𝑙𝑙8 ∗ 𝑉𝑉(𝑗𝑗)     (11) 
The weights should be set by the household, and not assumed for them. The resulting 𝑄𝑄(𝑗𝑗) for 
each type of temporary housing is compared in the evaluation model. The highest quality of life 
index provides the optimal temporary housing accommodation for that particular household. The 
developed framework can be implemented in one of two ways, at the household level and at the 
community level. The procedure described above with the formulation of the quality of life index 
reflects the implementation at the individual household level. The framework allows for the 
selection of a particular temporary housing unit based on one specific type of household in 
consideration.  
While ensuring a household’s quality of life is important in post-disaster temporary 
housing, community-level constraints and restrictions tend to drive the selection of temporary 
housing accommodations. The household level framework discussed above can be scaled back to 
a community-level analysis, as shown in figure 4. The community-level framework, whether that 
be at the city-level, county-level, or state-level shows that additional constraints outside of 
household needs and preferences must be considered. Two inputs are used at the community 
level, the first being community restraints, and the second population characteristics. Any 
restrictive details are what must be included in the community-level constraints input. This will, 
most importantly, include a budget for temporary housing, as well as other limitations such as 
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what units are available, at what quantity are they available, and timing of delivery to the 
household. The population characteristic input includes information on the various types of 
households in need of a temporary housing unit. These population characteristics feed directly 
into the household description of the household-level analysis. The household level analysis is 
iterated until each household in the community has been recommended a temporary housing 
accommodation through the quality of life index. While the quality of life for households 
residing in a temporary housing unit is of high priority in this work, more often than not, it will 
not be feasible for a community to provide each household with their optimal unit. The next step 
is to employ the community level constraints, along with the individual households’ quality of 
life in order to develop a temporary housing recommended distribution for the entire community.   
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CHAPTER V. EXEMPLIFYING FRAMEWORK 
With the extensive information pulled from the literature and the quality quantifications 
formulated, the integrated sustainability and resilience model can be implemented to recommend 
an optimal temporary housing unit for a household and assignments across a community. Nine 
types of temporary housing units were used to exemplify the quantitative procedures described 
above. Once the units have been evaluated, two procedures for using the developed framework 
are demonstrated, first at the household level and then at the community level. The household 
level analysis includes a sensitivity analysis which shows how different households drive the 
selection of temporary housing units. The community level analysis includes a case study of East 
Baton Rouge Parish after severe flooding in August 2016 and how that community could have 
distributed temporary housing units based on the needs of households but constrained by the 
funds available for post-disaster housing recovery. To show the robustness of the framework, the 
eight temporary housing options were evaluated based on the wind hazard of a hurricane and 
again with a flooding event. The flooding event was used for the household sensitivity analysis 
and the community-level case study. For all analyses, the location of the hazards remain the 
same which is along the Gulf Coast, particularly Baton Rouge, Louisiana.  
Temporary housing unit evaluations 
Nine types of units were chosen to explicitly depict the quantification of each of the 
described qualities of temporary housing. The units and programs selected for evaluated are 
shown in figure 7. While there are many other types of temporary housing options and programs 
that have been developed after disasters over the years, the ones chosen are units and programs 
that have extensive and reoccurring information found in the literature. Any type of temporary 
housing unit can be input into the model as long enough detailing is available for evaluation. The 
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selected temporary housing units and accompanying programs include ones with issues and 
complications, as well as options that are new and innovative and have been discussed heavily in 
the preceding chapters. For the purpose of this model, a unit was considered not accessible if a 
household experiences a half-hour or larger increase in transportation time to everyday needs 
such as work, schools, or grocery stores, or if the household is unable to use public transportation 
if it was their means for travel pre-disaster. An example of accessible is having the manufactured 
housing unit on the household’s pre-disaster property or a hotel in the same city as the pre-
disaster home. An example of inaccessible is the manufactured home on a commercial group site 
outside of the disaster area, or a hotel 30 or so miles away. 
 
Figure 7. Post-Disaster Temporary Housing Options 
All of these unit options are evaluated based on the sustainability and resilience criteria 
described in the previous chapter. Some of the qualities, namely, adaptability, customizability, 
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population stability, health impacts, and financial cost, are based on the information pulled 
directly from the literature about each temporary housing units in Chapter 3 using the 
quantification procedure discussed in Chapter 4. Environmental impacts, structural integrity, and 
hazard vulnerability involved specific and detailed numerical analysis. The first of the two 
hazards, wind, is considered in temporary housing accommodation evaluations. Table 5 
summarizes the quantification of each of the eight qualities for all nine temporary housing units 
in consideration with respect to a wind hazard event, and table 6 summarizes the quantifications 
with respect to a flooding hazard. 

























































































Manufactured Housing Unit 0 0 1 8720 1 129,000 0 1 
Inaccessible FEMA-Issued 
Manufactured Housing Unit 0 0 0 8720 1 149,000 0 1 
Multi-Family Lease and Repair 
Program 1 1 2 3367 0 16,308 0 1 
Accessible Hotel Stays 0 0 1 2886 1 56,393 0 1 
Inaccessible Hotel Stays 0 0 0 2886 1 56,393 0 1 
RAPIDO 1 3 2 5670 0 69,000 0 1 
Katrina Cottage 1 2 1 9120 0 70,000 0 1 
Damaged Home 1 2 1 11,200 1 0 3 1 







































































































Manufactured Housing Unit 0 0 1 8720 1 129,000 0 5.000 
Inaccessible FEMA-Issued 
Manufactured Housing Unit 0 0 0 8720 1 149,000 0 5.000 
Multi-Family Lease and Repair 
Program 1 1 2 3367 0 16,308 0 2.072 
Accessible Hotel Stays 0 0 1 2886 1 56,393 0 2.072 
Inaccessible Hotel Stays 0 0 0 2886 1 56,393 0 2.072 
RAPIDO 1 3 2 5670 0 69,000 0 5.000 
Katrina Cottage 1 2 1 9120 0 70,000 0 5.000 
Damaged Home 1 2 1 11,200 1 0 3 2.072 
Shelter at Home Program 1 2 2 11,200 0 15,000 1 2.072 
 
As shown in the two tables above, for most qualities (i.e., adaptability, customizability, 
population stability, environmental impacts, health impacts, and financial cost) are measured 
consistently between the two hazard events in question. Structural integrity and hazard 
vulnerability are derived from separate analysis. 
RAPIDO units, Katrina Cottages, a damaged home, and the Shelter at Home programs all 
prove to be adaptable since a move-in unit is not needed from the temporary to permanent 
housing phase. The Multi-Family Lease and Repair Program is evaluated as adaptable since it 
requires a permanent housing plan, as discussed in table 1. The Multi-Family Lease and Repair 
Program is measured 1 for customizability meaning that the households can modify the interior 
décor of the unit to fit their needs. Units measuring 2 for customizability include Katrina 
Cottage, damaged home, and Shelter at Home program, since they all provide the ability to 
choose or change the layout of the unit in addition to the customizability of the interior and 
exterior appearance. Katrina cottages have various unit layouts for selection, and the nature of 
the Shelter at Home program allows the household to make their own permanent repairs or 
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changes to the house as desired. Although those who stay in damaged homes may do so due to 
limited resources, in theory, they have the (legal) ability to change the unit how they please. 
RAPIDO units proved to be the most customizable being the only unit where the location of the 
unit is a decision the household can make on top of the other customizable features. 
Population stability in some cases is embedded in the temporary housing program itself. 
For example, the Multi-Family Lease and Repair Program restricts the apartment selection to the 
disaster area, and the Shelter at Home program was developed specifically to keep households in 
their pre-disaster home. Both of these programs center on keeping the local economy stimulated 
after the disaster rather than having their residents circulate their funds outside the community. 
The RAPIDO program intends to do the same by having the units placed on the pre-disaster 
property. RAPIDO also aims specifically to create jobs. They have developed units that can be 
transported and installed by residents (Morales-Diaz, 2016). Although the Multi-Family Lease 
and Repair Program and the Shelter at Home program do not explicitly state their ability to 
create jobs, they must hire out contractors and workers to complete the repairs, thus stimulating 
the local job force. FEMA trailers and hotels that are accessible keep residents within the 
community, as well as Katrina Cottages, and staying in damaged home. Therefore, the only units 
that have no contribution to population stability are the inaccessible FEMA-issued manufactured 
housing units and hotels since it keeps the residents occupying these units outside of the 
community.  
 The environmental impacts of each of the temporary housing units was not a specific 
quality that was discussed thoroughly throughout the literature but is especially important with 
respect to sustainability. ATHENA Impact Estimator for Buildings (2017) was used to perform 
an LCA for each of the temporary housing options. The FEMA-issued manufactured housing 
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units, RAPIDO units, Katrina Cottages, and the two options for a single-family dwelling home 
(damaged home and Shelter at Home Program) were assumed to be a single family residential 
building type. The hotels and Multi-Family Lease and Repair Program were assumed to be 
multi-unit residential-rental building type. For the FEMA-issued manufactured housing units, a 
typical wood-framed manufactured home was assumed. The same wood-frame, single-story, 
single family dwelling was assumed for both the damaged home and the Shelter at Home 
Program. Katrina Cottages and RAPIDO units were also assumed to be single-story wood-frame 
dwellings with floor plans that matched their individual specifications. For the RAPIDO unit, 
only the temporary “CORE” was considered to keep the temporary housing phase constant on all 
units. The Multi-Family Lease and Repair program was modeled with a four-story wood frame 
apartment building, and the hotel was assumed to be a three-story wood and steel frame building. 
All buildings were assumed to be in Atlanta, Georgia, the closest location selection to disaster 
area, Baton Rouge, with a building life expectancy of 50 years, to keep comparisons consistent 
across types of units. The specific floor plans, necessary assumptions, and total inputs for each 
temporary housing unit can be found in Appendix A.  
ATHENA Impact Estimator (2017) takes specifications of building assemblies (i.e. 
foundation, walls, columns and beams, roof, and floor) to produce estimated values for fossil fuel 
consumption, global warming potential, acidification potential, human health criteria, 
eutrophication potential, ozone depletion potential, and smog potential. The total values for each 
of these seven LCA measures include the amount emitted during each phase of the project, 
production, construction process, use, and end of life. For this particular environmental impact 
evaluation, the total global warming potential from production to end of life is used for 
comparison, but this is not to say that the remainder of the measures are not of concern. The 
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global warming potential is estimated in kilograms of CO2 equivalent. After the LCAs were 
performed the following values were estimated for each unit in kg CO2 eq: 8720 for the 
manufactured housing unit; 11,200 for the single-family dwelling; 5670 for the RAPIDO core; 
9120 for the Katrina Cottage; 228,000 for the entire hotel; and 20,200 for the entire apartment 
building. To keep the values per unit, the hotel and apartment global warming potential were 
divided by the number of units within the respective building. With 79 units for the hotel and 6 
units in the apartment building, the global warming potential is reduced to 2890 kg CO2 eq per 
unit in the hotel, and 3370 kg CO2 per unit in the apartment. Therefore, with respect to 
environmental impacts, the hotel has the highest impact for overall structure, but has the lowest 
when considering individual occupied units. Figure 8 shows the breakdown in total global 
warming potential for each life cycle stage for each temporary housing unit.  
 
Figure 8. Life Cycle Environmental Impacts 
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 Records on health impacts are extracted directly from the literature based on the 
measurement criteria discussed in Chapter 4. The values for the financial cost is also based on 
findings in the literature and can be found in table 2. To keep measurements consistent, a time 
period of 18 months was assumed for the total time spent in the temporary housing phase. 
FEMA-issued manufactured housing unit, RAPIDO unit, and the Katrina Cottage are all values 
explicitly stated in the literature and can also be found in table 2. The total cost for Multi-Family 
Lease and Repair Program is estimated from their lease agreement value which includes the fair 
market and the duration of temporary housing (FEMA, 2013). With the assumed disaster in 
Baton Rouge, specifically, the fair market rent for a two-bedroom is $906, which over 18 months 
can be totaled to be $16,308 (HUD User, 2018). The hotel stays were also estimated using 18-
month time frame. With an average hotel room at $103 a night, over 18 months, the total for one 
household to remain in a hotel is $56,393 (Jones, 2017).  
The structural integrity of each of the temporary housing units is the structural state the 
unit is in at the time of occupancy. HAZUS (DHS, 2015) building performance curves 
conditioned on maximum wind speed for a hurricane-prone region were adopted for the wind 
event, and 50th percentile flood depths from van de Lindt et al, (2018) were adopted for the flood 
event for measuring the structural integrity. Although these separate building performance 
criteria are based on two different hazard causing different types of damage to the building, one 
causing wind related damages (i.e., window damage, roof, sheathing, or wall frame failure,) and 
the other causing water related damages (i.e., drywall and baseboard damage, mold, sewer back 
up), the damage relative to occupancy status for both hazards remain consistent with those 
described in table 4. Table 7 shows the damage states and descriptions with respect to wind 
damage and flood damage.  
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Table 7. Wind (DHS, 2015) and Flood (van de Lindt et al., 2018) Damage State 
Descriptions  
DS Wind Description Flood Description 
0 Little or no visible damage from the outside. 
No broken windows, or failed roof deck. 
Minimal loss of roof over, with no or very 
limited water penetration. 
No damage; water enters crawlspace or touches 
foundation (crawlspace or slab on grade). No contact to 
electrical or plumbing, etc. in crawlspace. No contact with 
floor joists. No sewer backup into living area. 
1 Maximum of one broken window, door or 
garage door. Moderate roof cover loss that 
can be covered to prevent additional water 
entering the building. Marks or dents on walls 
requiring painting or patching for repair. 
Water touches floor joists up to minor water enters house; 
damage to carpets, pads, baseboards, flooring. 
Approximately 1” in house but no drywall damage. Could 
have some mold on subfloor above crawlspace.  Could 
have minor sewer backup and/or minor mold issues. 
2 Major roof cover damage, moderate window 
breakage. Minor roof sheathing failure. Some 
resulting damage to interior of building from 
water 
Water level approximately 2 feet with associated drywall 
damage and electrical damage, water heater and furnace 
and other major equipment on first floor damaged. Lower 
bathroom and kitchen cabinets damaged. Doors or 
windows may need replacement.  Could have major sewer 
backup and /or major mold issues. 
3 Major window damage or roof sheathing loss. 
Major roof cover loss. Extensive damage to 
interior from water. 
Water level 2 feet to 8 feet; substantial drywall damage, 
electrical panel destroyed, bathroom/kitchen cabinets and 
appliances damaged; lighting fixtures on walls destroyed; 
ceiling lighting may be ok. Studs reusable; some may be 
damaged.  Could have major sewer backup and/or major 
mold issues. 
4 Complete roof failure and/or, failure of wall 
frame. Loss of more than 50% of roof 
sheathing. 
Significant structural damage present; all drywall, 
appliances, cabinets etc. destroyed. Could be floated off 
foundation. Building must be demolished or potentially 
replaced. 
 
All of the temporary housing units or accommodations, other than the Shelter at Home 
Program and the damaged home, should be at damage state 0, unless for some unforeseen reason, 
the household is provided with a faulty unit. The Shelter at Home program is assumed to be in 
damage state 1 at occupancy. The original damage to the home may be damage state 1 or 2 
depending on the disaster, but assuming the $15,000 capped temporary repairs have been made 
prior to occupancy, the home would be around damage state 1. The other temporary housing 
option where the structural integrity exceeds 0, is the option to remain in the damaged home. The 
damage state would change proportionally to the level of the disaster. For this evaluation, 
damage state 3 will be used for the structural integrity of the home. Damage state 3 is too heavily 
damaged to be included in the Shelter at Home program but damaged enough to contract illness 
from being exposed to the elements without adequate housing. 
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 Several building performance curves conditioned on wind speed were analyzed in order 
to measure the hazard vulnerability of each temporary housing accommodation with respect to a 
wind event. Appendix B details the challenges and limitations that stemmed from the process of 
determining this particular quantification. With hurdles in building performance data, the hazard 
vulnerability for all the temporary housing options was set to unity until more in-depth data can 
be collected in this regard. Damage states with respect to flood damage was adopted for the 
evaluation of a flooding event (van de Lindt et al., 2018). These damage states spell out the 50th 
percentile flood depth that was used to calculate the hazard vulnerability according to equations 
9 and 10. Table 8 specified the 50th percentile depth of flood waters inside the home, known as 
inundation level, for each particular damage state. 
Table 8. Flood Event Damage States 








Several temporary housing units, RAPIDO, Katrina Cottages, and FEMA manufactured 
housing units, are elevated from ground-level to reduce flooding inside the unit which means that 
a higher flood depth would be required to reach a certain inundation level and therefore a certain 
damage state. Each of the elevated units, RAPIDO, units, Katrina Cottages, and FEMA MHUs, 
are all raised 24 inches from ground level, meaning that 24 extra inches of flood depth is 
required to reach the inundation levels that would cause the same level of damage as the units at 
ground level. Table 9 summarizes the flood depth required for each unit to reach the 50th 
percentile inundation level. These values are used as the 50th percentile IM, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖, in equation 9, 
furthermore using equation 10, the values found in table 6 are derived for hazard vulnerability. 
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Flood Depth required to reach 50th percentile 
inundation level (in) 
DS 0 DS 1 DS 2 DS 3 DS 4 
Accessible FEMA-Issued 
Manufactured Housing Unit 
24 24 25 48 84 132 
Inaccessible FEMA-Issued 
Manufactured Housing Unit 
24 24 25 48 84 132 
Multi-Family Lease and 
Repair Program 
0 0 1 24 60 108 
Accessible Hotel Stays 0 0 1 24 60 108 
Inaccessible Hotel Stays 0 0 1 24 60 108 
RAPIDO 24 24 25 48 84 132 
Katrina Cottage 24 24 25 48 84 132 
Damaged Home 0 0 1 24 60 108 
Shelter at Home Program 0 0 1 24 60 108 
 
In an effort to compare the temporary housing solutions to each other, the values are normalized 
as percentages of the accommodation that performs the best with respect to that particular 
quality. This means that the temporary housing option that performs the best has a value of 1.0 
for that particular quality, and the other options are between 0 and 1.0, a percentage of the 
highest performing unit. The normalized quality values for each temporary housing 
accommodation can be found in table 10 for wind hazard and table 11 for flood. 























































































Manufactured Housing Unit 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.331 0.000 0.134 1.000 1.000 
Inaccessible FEMA-Issued 
Manufactured Housing Unit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.331 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Multi-Family Lease and 
Repair Program 1.000 0.333 1.000 0.857 1.000 0.891 1.000 1.000 
Accessible Hotel Stays 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.622 1.000 1.000 
Inaccessible Hotel Stays 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.625 1.000 1.000 
RAPIDO 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.509 1.000 0.537 1.000 1.000 
Katrina Cottage 1.000 0.667 0.500 0.316 1.000 0.530 1.000 1.000 
Damaged Home 1.000 0.667 0.500 0.258 0.000 1.000 0.250 1.000 
Shelter at Home Program 1.000 0.667 1.000 0.258 1.000 0.899 0.750 1.000 
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Manufactured Housing Unit 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.331 0.000 0.134 1.000 1.000 
Inaccessible FEMA-Issued 
Manufactured Housing Unit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.331 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Multi-Family Lease and 
Repair Program 1.000 0.333 1.000 0.857 1.000 0.891 1.000 0.414 
Accessible Hotel Stays 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.622 1.000 0.414 
Inaccessible Hotel Stays 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.625 1.000 0.414 
RAPIDO 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.509 1.000 0.537 1.000 1.000 
Katrina Cottage 1.000 0.667 0.500 0.316 1.000 0.530 1.000 1.000 
Damaged Home 1.000 0.667 0.500 0.258 0.000 1.000 0.250 0.414 
Shelter at Home Program 1.000 0.667 1.000 0.258 1.000 0.899 0.750 0.414 
 
Another way these results can be communicated are through radar plots, shown in figure 
9. Figure 9a-d shows plots for wind and figure 9e-h shows flood. These plots have each 
temporary housing quality on a different axis. The farther out one temporary housing 
accommodation is, the better it performs along that particular axis quality. For example, figure 
9a depicts both accessible and inaccessible FEMA-issued manufactured housing units. The 
accessible unit is closer to 1.0 along the population stability axis, so it is considered to perform 
better in that characteristic. Figure 9b shows the accessible and inaccessible hotel stays, and 
comparing both 9a and 9b, both the environmental impacts perform significantly better than both 
the FEMA-issued manufactured housing unit, and slightly better with respect to financial cost. 
The two custom units, RAPIDO units and Katrina Cottages, are shown in figure 9c. The 
maximum performance for several qualities, adaptability, health, customizability, and population 
stability, are shown here along the perimeter of the graph. FEMA’s other two temporary housing 
programs are shown in figure 9d along with the option of remaining in a damaged home. This 
radar plot shows the best performance in financial cost with the Shelter at Home program 
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reaching the maximum value of 1.0, but it also shows a fairly low performance by the Multi-
Family Lease and Repair program with respect to customizability. The damaged home depicts a 
high adaptability performance, 1.0, but shows the lowest health impacts at 0. Another way to 
interpret these radar plots is that the temporary housing option with the largest area performs the 
overall best. Analyzing the plots in figure 9, RAPIDO, and Shelter at Home program have very 
large areas for both hazard events, while the Multi-Family Lease and Repair program and 
Katrina Cottage have notable areas as well. A general conclusion can be drawn that these large 
area accommodations, (RAPIDO, Shelter at Home, Multi-Family Lease and Repair, and Katrina 
Cottages) perform overall better than the units with smaller areas, FEMA-issued manufactured 
housing units, hotels, and damaged home. These radar plots were used to easily depict the 
temporary housing accommodation evaluations. Not all of the evaluations are measured on the 
same scale, for example, adaptability and health are binary, whereas financial cost consists of a 




Figure 9. Temporary Housing Normalized Quality Value Radar Plots: (a) Accessible and 
Inaccessible FEMA-Issued MHUs for Wind Hazard; (b) Accessible and Inaccessible Hotel 
Stays for Wind Hazard; (c) RAPIDO Program and Katrina Cottage for Wind Hazard; (d) 
Shelter at Home Program, Multi-Family Lease and Repair, and Damaged Home for Wind 
Hazard; (e) Accessible and Inaccessible FEMA-Issued MHUs for Flood Hazard; (f) 
Accessible and Inaccessible Hotel Stays for Flood Hazard; (g) RAPIDO Program and 
Katrina Cottage for Flood Hazard; (h) Shelter at Home Program, Multi-Family Lease and 
Repair, and Damaged Home for Flood Hazard 
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The radar plots for both wind and flood depict the temporary housing units’ quality 
values with the weights considered in equation 11 set to unity. This would be the case if 
household preferences and needs were not taken into consideration. From the plots, RAPIDO 
seems to perform the overall best with the largest area; however, not every household would 
benefit from this particular temporary housing accommodation, nor would the community 
overall. A household sensitivity analysis follows to demonstrate how the needs of households 
can govern the selection of post-disaster temporary housing and better support community 
budgetary constraints.  
Household sensitivity analysis 
The temporary housing evaluation framework at the household-level, shown in figure 5, 
can be used for a number of varying situations. For this example, the household description will 
be manipulated to demonstrate how the model depends on this particular input of the framework 
and how to select temporary housing units based on different needs. First, the other two inputs 
will be defined. The disaster scenario input, which will remain constant and based on the 
temporary housing evaluations, is a wind event along the Gulf of Mexico coast, around Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana, in particular, as described in the previous section. This hazard and location 
were selected based on the depth of information that was extracted from the literature. Part of the 
disaster scenario includes the level of damage which will also stay consistent. In order to show a 
wide array of temporary housing options, damage levels are specified. The damage assumed to 
take place as a result of a Gulf Coast wind event is moderate damage to structurally sound 
homes, and severe damage to structurally deficient homes. Different levels of damage to the pre-
disaster home is also explored to show varying needs. Using the damage states defined by 
HAZUS (2015) the levels of damage are damage state 2 for structurally sound homes and 
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damage state 3 for structurally deficient homes. The level of damage to the pre-disaster home can 
help guide the selection of the temporary housing accommodation that is adequate for a 
household. The other consistent input, temporary housing options, consists of all of the units and 
accommodations that were presented and evaluated in the previous section and shown in figure 
7.  
The household description input includes 6 hypothetical households articulated for 
demonstrative purposes. Some temporary housing units may be best for one type of household 
but may not be the most ideal for another. For example, some households may need an entire 
new housing unit, and another may need a short-term option while they make manageable repairs 
to their home. Some households may need different sizes and layout of units based on household 
size and structure. The different hypothetical households used for comparison are described in 
table 12.  
Table 12. Household Descriptions  
Household Description 
1 Middle class income; professional jobs, 2 adults in household without persons under 
18 living in household; adequate insurance coverage; home owner; pre-disaster 
home structurally sound 
2 Upper/middle class income, professional jobs; 4 to 5 household members, with 2 
adults and persons under 18 living in household; adequate insurance coverage; home 
owner; pre-disaster home structurally sound 
3 Senior couple, both retired, one is handicap, limited insurance; home owner; pre-
disaster home structurally sound 
4 Low income; service employee; 3 to 4 household members, with 1 adult and 
multiple persons under 18 living in household; limited insurance; homeowner; pre-
disaster home structurally deficient 
5 Low income; service employees; 5 to 7 household members, with 2 adults and 
persons under 18 living in household; no insurance; homeowner; pre-disaster home 
structurally deficient 
6 Low income; service employee; 3 to 4 household members, with 1 adult and persons 
under 18 living in household; limited insurance; multi-family housing renter 
 
 The household descriptions provided in table 12 are used to assign weights to each of the 
temporary housing qualities, as show in in equation 11. The weights are in place to allow 
households to rank their preferences in post-disaster temporary housing qualities. The weights 
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assigned to each of these virtual households are by no means correct or based on any specific 
households; they were assumed based on hypothetical needs of the households often articulated 
throughout the literature referenced in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. The quality weights for 
each household can be found in table 13. 
Table 13. Household Quality Weights  











𝑙𝑙1, Adaptability 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
𝑙𝑙2, Customizability 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
𝑙𝑙3, Population Stability 1.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
𝑙𝑙4, Environmental Impacts 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 
𝑙𝑙5, Health Impacts 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
𝑙𝑙6, Financial Cost 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
𝑙𝑙7, Structural Integrity 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
𝑙𝑙8, Hazard Vulnerability 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 
Households 1 and 2 may have less priority on the adaptability of the unit since they both 
have adequate pre-disaster home and the means to take care of repairs on their own. Household 3 
may have emphasis on adaptability to reduce frequent moving due to mobility issues of 
household members. Households 4 and 5 have older homes, which means they are more 
susceptible to sustain higher levels damage, so these households may need temporary 
accommodations that could turn into permanent solutions if their home cannot be repaired or is 
unfeasible to repair. Household 6 also needs an adaptable solution since they did not have their 
own home pre-disaster, and since they were in a multi-family unit, post-disaster decisions are 
made by landlords, possibly leaving the household without their previous unit. Customizability 
of the unit may be important to households with children in order to make them feel more 
comfortable living out of their pre-disaster home such as households 2 and 5. Population stability 
may be important to those households who have working adults that want to stay close to their 
jobs. It can also be important to those who may have lost their jobs as a result of the disaster and 
have large families to rely on a temporary housing program that create a way to earn income 
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during recovery1. Environmental impacts may be of concern to some, but others may consider 
other qualities of higher importance. The health impacts are of major concern to everyone, most 
people do not want their health to be in jeopardy by residing in temporary housing, and so all 
households have been given heath as a priority. Financial cost can be a challenging quality to 
weigh because most of the time finance comes into play with a particular agency, governmental 
or private, that is providing the temporary housing accommodations. The cost of the post-disaster 
housing can also come right out of the household’s pocket as well; either they have the means to 
do so, or they do not have other options for assistance. For the purpose of this sensitivity 
analysis, households 1 and 2 have a weight of 1 assuming they have large enough savings and 
sufficient insurance coverage allowing them to fund their own repair and housing needs. 
Households 3, 4, 5, and 6 are assigned a weight of 0 assuming that these households would not 
be able to repair their homes without receiving temporary housing accommodations with the 
assistance of recovery programs. Structural integrity is high priority for those who foresee 
spending an extended period of time in their temporary housing unit. Households 4 and 5 are 
assumed to spend a longer amount of time in their temporary accommodations sine it is assumed 
that their pre-disaster home will experience more damage, while households 1 and 2 may spend 
less time with less damage to their pre-disaster home. This also goes hand in hand with 
adaptability; if a household is expecting a temporary turned permanent solution, the need for 
structural safety of the unit is higher than those who are residing in the unit temporarily. Finally, 
since all those in temporary housing units are susceptible to additional disasters, regardless of the 
duration of stay, hazard vulnerability has been weighted as 1 for each of the households.  
                                                 
1 Previous disasters have shown people with service jobs are more likely to lose those jobs during a disaster leaving 
households that rely on their paycheck to lose their income (Masozera et al., 2007; Mueller et al, 2011; Van Zandt 
and Sloan, 2017). 
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With the temporary housing units evaluated for a wind event based on the specified 
sustainability and resilience qualities, and the household weights specified, equation 11 can be 
implemented. Each temporary housing unit will produce a different quality of life index for a 
household, and the unit that creates the highest quality of life index is the optimal unit for that 
particular household. Table 14 shows the summed quality of life of each temporary housing 
accommodation for each household. Figure 10 also shows these indices in a graphical form.  
Table 14. Quality of Life Indices 


















1.17 1.00 2.00 2.17 2.00 2.00 
Multi-Family Lease 
and Repair Program 
4.82 4.22 4.00 5.43 5.17 5.00 
Accessible Hotel 
Stays 
2.62 1.87 2.00 3.00 2.50 2.50 
Inaccessible Hotel 
Stays 
2.12 1.62 2.00 2.50 2.00 2.00 
RAPIDO 4.29 4.54 4.00 5.25 5.50 5.00 
Katrina Cottage 3.69 3.95 4.00 4.66 4.83 4.50 
Damaged Home 3.13 3.42 2.25 2.88 3.08 2.75 
Shelter at Home 
Program 




Figure 10. Quality of Life Indices for Households: (a) Household 1; (b) Household 2; (c) 
Household 3; (d) Household 4; (e) Household 5; (f) Household 6 
 
Some households have one clear temporary housing accommodation that provides the 
highest quality of life, while others have multiple recommendations. Households 1, 2, 4, and 5 
have a single highest quality of life, all of which follow reasonable suit with their housing needs. 
Households 1 and 2 are expected to not experience as much damage to their pre-disaster home as 
some of the other households since they are assumed to have more structurally sound homes, 
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meaning reasonable repairs for damage are assumed rather than major repairs or total 
destruction. Therefore, the recommendations of Multi-Family Lease and Repair program for 
household 1 and the Shelter at Home program for household 2 seem intuitive. Multi-Family 
Lease and Repair allow the couple in household 1 have a temporary place to reside while they 
complete the repairs to their home on their own. Since only two people need to be taken care of, 
the adaptability and customizability of the unit are not of major concern. This particular program 
also allows household 1 to remain inside the community making access to their jobs easy and 
safe further assisting their recovery. Household 2 is slightly different with adding the concern of 
children. Having multiple children make living in smaller spaces difficult such as a hotel or an 
apartment building. The recommended Shelter at Home program offers a larger space since the 
pre-disaster home is being occupied. With children also comes the need for adaptability. The 
smoother the transition to permanent housing and community recovery, the more stable the 
children are in their own individual recovery (Abramson et al., 2015). The high emphasis on 
customizability and adaptability are focused here, mostly for the recovery of the children. This 
program narrows the time taken to move from temporary to permeant housing while offering the 
comfort and size of the pre-disaster home to accommodate a large household. This program, as 
with the Multi-Family Lease and Repair program, keeps the household in the community 
allowing for an easy return to school and jobs. Household 4 is also recommended the Multi-
Family Lease and Repair program. While this household has children as well, the household a 
whole is not as large as household 2 therefore making smaller units more reasonable. Regardless 
if their pre-disaster home can be repairs or if they have to find a new home, this particular 
program gives the household a substantial place to live, inside the community, while working 
with them to establish a permanent housing plan. All of these aspects can be beneficial, 
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especially to a single parent with a single income post-disaster. The RAPIDO program is 
suggested for household 5. This program provides a totally new temporary turned permanent 
housing unit on the pre-disaster property. Since this household will experience severe damage to 
an already structurally deficient building, without outside financial resources other than 
assistance programs, it may be in their best interest to have a new housing unit that can serve as a 
temporary housing unit following the disaster and can eventually expand to a large permanent 
home that can accommodate their entire family. The RAPIDO program would also allow this 
household to have a better home, with respect to structural performance than if they would try to 
repair the pre-disaster home.   
When multiple housing options are recommended, considering the household’s lifestyle, can 
help with the selection. For example, household 3 has three suggested optimal housing solutions: 
Multi-Family Lease and Repair program, RAPIDO, and Katrina Cottage. Considering the needs 
of household 3, the Multi-Family Lease and Repair program, which utilizes an apartment 
building, may not be the best solution with the mobility issues this household may experience. 
Here, both RAPIDO and Katrina Cottages would make moving in and around the unit easier. 
RAPIDO could be an ideal solution if the household wanted an entire new home, but since the 
pre-disaster home may not sustain enough damage to make this option feasible, a Katrina 
Cottage could be considered the optimal unit. The Katrina Cottage would provide the 
accessibility and feel of a home, while allowing the household to reside on their pre-disaster 
property while taking care of their home repairs. This also keeps the household in the community 
allowing the circulation of funds to remain in borders. Household 6 also has two suggested 
optimal units: Multi-Family Lease and Repair program and RAPIDO. This household does not 
have pre-disaster property in which to place a totally new unit. In this case, the Multi-Family 
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Lease and Repair program is a better option for this household, giving them a temporary place to 
live while helping them develop a permanent housing plan in the meantime. Table 15 
summarizes the recommended optimal temporary housing for each household. 
Table 15. Recommended Temporary Housing Accommodations 
Household Recommended Temporary Housing Accommodation 
Household 1 Multi-Family Lease and Repair Program 
Household 2 Shelter at Home Program 
Household 3 Katrina Cottage 
Household 4 Multi-Family Lease and Repair Program 
Household 5 RAPIDO 
Household 6 Multi-Family Lease and Repair Program 
 
No two households are alike, and therefore no two households have the same needs in post-
disaster temporary housing. The type of household in need of housing accommodations is the 
driving component of this developed framework in selecting temporary housing units. The 
differences in households and their needs stem from the social vulnerability of the pre-disaster 
community, meaning some households are subject to a longer road to recovery based on their 
income level, insurance coverage, the structural reliability of their pre-disaster home, and the 
number of household members. If household preferences are not taken into consideration, based 
on the method of the framework, each household would be assigned the same unit which would 
not be feasible for the recovery of either the household or the community.  
Exemplified in this example are temporary housing accommodation selections made without 
any regard to the community-level and logistical constraints, which can include how fast the 
household would receive their temporary housing accommodation, what funds are available to 
pay for the accommodation, and how the quantities of each unit are available and desired by 
households. The following example uses a community-level case study to exemplify other 




Community-level case study 
While ensuring that all households are housed in temporary housing accommodations that 
maximize their quality of life is a key point in post-disaster recovery, there are underlying factors 
that ultimately govern temporary housing selections. These factors can include budgetary 
restrictions, temporary housing unit quantities, time needed to receive the units, and other 
logistical constraints associated with the nature of the specific hazard and community, such as 
debris removal and the availability of land to place temporary housing units. This case study 
aims to exemplify the framework shown in figure 4 that takes into consideration external 
limitations of community-wide disaster housing recovery. Information was used from reports 
published after the Louisiana floods of August 2016 (HUD, 2017). The information gained from 
the reports was used as baseline information, other assumptions were made in order to complete 
the community-level analysis at the depth it is intended. Those assumptions are discussed 
throughout. 
For this example, East Baton Rouge Parish in Louisiana is the community used for 
evaluation. The community-level restraint in consideration is the budget available for temporary 
housing. Based on the Department of Housing and Urban Development report from the floods 
(HUD, 2017), 36,938 units in East Baton Rouge Parish sustained some type of damage (minor-
low, minor-high, major-low, major-high, and severe) from the floods, including 24,255 owner-
occupied units and 12,683 rental units. The report continues to give statistics on those housing 
units that sustained major-low, major-high, and severe damage for the entire state. For owner-
occupied units, 79.98% of the total state-wide damaged units falls in the major-low major-high, 
and severe categories, and 80.62% of the state-wide total for renter-occupied. Major-low, major-
high, and severe damages are assumed to be directly related to damage states 2, 3, and 4 as 
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described in van de Lindt et al (2018). Assuming the residents of only these damage level units 
need some form of temporary housing and assuming the owner and renter damage level 
distribution across East Baton Rouge Parish mirrors the distribution of the entire state, the total 
households in consideration for temporary housing accommodations are 19,399 owners and 
10,225 renters. At the time of publication, $776,923,661.88 has been approved in the State of 
Louisiana for FEMA’s Individual and Household Programs (IHP) (FEMA, 2017c). The dollars 
approved to be used in FEMA’s IHP includes both financial and direct housing assistance which 
covers temporary housing but can also include payouts for personal property repair and 
replacement assistance, transportation assistance, moving and storage assistance, funeral 
assistance, medical and dental assistance, and childcare assistance (FEMA, 2016a). For the 
purpose of this case study, the total amount of IHP dollars approved for the flood is assumed to 
be for financial and direct housing assistance only. The funds allocated to East Baton Rouge 
Parish was assumed to be the same percentage as the number of units damaged in the parish 
compared to the state’s totals, which is 40.31% (HUD, 2017). Distributing that total to the 
owner-occupied households and renter households in need of temporary housing units in East 
Baton Rouge Parish, the budgetary constraint for this case study is assumed to be $205 million, 
owner-occupied households and $107 million for renter households.  
Census data was pulled to specify the population characteristics of East Baton Rouge Parish. 
For this evaluation, the population characteristics were broken down by household structure, 
either family households or nonfamily households. As defined by the United States Census 
Bureau, a “family household” is a household that has at least one member is related to the 
householder by marriage, birth, or adoption, and can be broken down into married-couple 
households; male householder, no wife present; and female householder, no husband present. A 
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“nonfamily household” includes those either living alone or household members living together 
that are not related to the householder (U. S. Census Bureau, 2016). Each of these categories can 
be broken down into age categories of householder 15-34, householder 35-64, and householder 
65 years and over. The above statistics are given for both owner-occupied units and renter-
occupied units. For the purpose of this analysis, single parent households are considered one 
category rather than two (one led by a male and one led by females). Household age categories 
of 15-34 and 35-64 are also considered one age category assuming their household needs are 
relatively similar. Married couple families, single parent families, and those householders living 
alone were broken down into age categories for this case study, and nonfamily households not 
living alone were considered one category regardless of age. Other specifications pulled from 
census data are the percentages of children under the age of 18 that are in owner- and renter-
occupied married couple families and single parent families. In this case study, only families in 
the household age category 15-64 are assumed to have children under 18 living in the home. 
Poverty statistics were explored as well. Totals were given for the amount of married couple 
families, married couple families with children, single parent families, and single parent families 
with children that are below the poverty line in East Baton Rouge parish. These totals are given 
independent of tenure status, so the percentages are assumed consistent between owner- and 
renter-occupied units in this case study example. Poverty levels were also looked for those in the 
age groups 15-34, 35-64, and 65 and older. These statistics were given independent of tenure 
status, family structure, and children. The distributions were assumed to be for those in poverty 
in nonfamily living alone, and nonfamily not living alone. Since there are limitations in the 
census data with regard to providing the exact information needed in this analysis, the following 
household categories and percentages of each in the population of East Baton Rouge Parish for 
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this example were estimated and simplified based on the statistics discussed above and are 
shown in table 16.  












1 Family household, married couple, age 15-64, with children, in poverty 0.80 % 0.11 % 
2 Family household, married couple, age 15-64, with children, not in poverty 12.10 % 1.63 % 
3 Family household, married couple, age 15-64, without children, in poverty 1.23 % 0.64 % 
4 Family household, married couple, age 15-64, without children, not in poverty 26.17 % 13.53 % 
5 Family Household, Married Couple, Age 65 and older, in poverty 1.20 % 0.13 % 
6 Family Household, Married Couple, Age 65 and older, not in poverty 12.00 % 1.27 % 
7 Family household, single parent, age 15-64, with children, in poverty 1.20 % 5.23 % 
8 Family household, single parent, age 15-64, with children, not in poverty 1.51 % 6.58 % 
9 Family household, single parent, age 15-64, without children, in poverty 3.53 % 4.78 % 
10 Family household, single parent, age 15-64, without children, not in poverty 6.95 % 9.41 % 
11 Family household, single parent, age 65 and older, in poverty 0.38 % 0.13 % 
12 Family household, single parent, age 65 and older, not in poverty 3.82 % 1.27 % 
13 Nonfamily household, living alone, age 15-64, in poverty 2.83 % 6.57 % 
14 Nonfamily household, living alone, age 15-64, not in poverty 12.07 % 28.03 % 
15 Nonfamily household, living alone, age 65 and older, in poverty 0.94 % 0.62 % 
16 Nonfamily household, living alone, age 65 and older, not in poverty 9.36 % 6.18 % 
17 Nonfamily, not living alone 3.90 % 13.90 % 
  
Each of these households are evaluated at damage states 2, 3, and 4. The percentages of each 
household in each damage state are assumed to be the same distribution of those state-wide. For 
each owner-occupied household, 27.39% is assumed to be in damage state 2, 49.41% in damage 
state 3, and 23.20% in damage state 4. For each renter-occupied household, 33.20%, 45.18%, 
and 21.62% are in damage states 2, 3, and 4, respectively.  
With a $205 million financial budget for owner-occupied households and a $107 million 
financial budget for renter-occupied households has been specified for community level 
constraints, and with the assumed and estimated population characteristics for East Baton Rouge 
shown in table 16, the next step of the community-level framework, the household-level 
evaluation, is completed for each of these 17 household types. The disaster scenario is a flooding 
event that replicated the August 2016 Louisiana flood event, the household descriptions are the 
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ones shown above, and the temporary housing options are the ones shown in figure 7. The 
temporary housing unit evaluations are consistent with the example discussed above, as shown in 
table 11 and calculated with equations 1 thru 9; however, 17 new sets of household weights, to 
be used in equation 11 for the quality of life index calculations have been assumed for this 
community-level analysis. The household weights are not based on any one particular household, 
nor are they true; they have been estimated based on assumed needs in post-disaster housing. The 
same weights are assumed for the owner-occupied household and its renter-occupied household 
counterpart assuming their needs would be the same. What will differ here are not the needs in a 
post-disaster home, but what accommodations would be available to those who rent versus those 
who own pre-disaster. Table 17 provides the household weights for each of the 17 households 





























































































































1 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
2 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
3 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
4 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
6 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
7 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
8 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
9 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
10 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
11 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
12 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
13 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
14 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
15 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
16 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
17 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
 
The household preferences assumptions follow logic as described in the household-level analysis 
but has been edited to fit the expected needs of the specified households. An important note is 
the weight of 0 assigned to each of the households for financial cost. Since this is a community-
level analysis, and units with only major-low, major-high, and severe levels of damage are 
considered, the financial cost of the temporary housing accommodations are assumed to come 
from an external funding source, rather than be a cost to the household individually, and is 
considered with the community-level constraints. The weights shown in table 17 were used for 
the formulation of the quality of life index for each unit for each household. Table 18 below 
shows the quality of life indices for owner-occupied households. 
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1 2.67 2.17 5.01 2.41 1.91 5.75 4.99 2.63 4.63 
2 2.25 2.00 3.75 1.66 1.41 5.00 4.42 2.08 3.83 
3 2.50 2.00 4.58 1.91 1.41 5.50 4.83 2.50 4.50 
4 1.67 1.17 3.34 1.41 0.91 3.75 3.16 1.54 3.04 
5 2.00 2.00 3.58 1.41 1.41 4.50 4.33 2.00 3.50 
6 2.00 2.00 3.41 1.41 1.41 4.00 4.00 1.66 3.16 
7 2.67 2.17 5.18 2.41 1.91 6.25 5.32 2.96 4.96 
8 2.67 2.17 4.84 2.41 1.91 5.25 4.66 2.29 4.29 
9 2.25 2.00 3.91 1.66 1.41 4.50 4.25 1.91 3.66 
10 1.50 1.00 2.91 0.91 0.41 3.50 3.00 1.41 2.91 
11 2.00 2.00 3.41 1.41 1.41 4.00 4.00 1.66 3.16 
12 2.00 2.00 3.41 1.41 1.41 4.00 4.00 1.66 3.16 
13 2.42 2.17 4.34 2.16 1.91 4.75 4.41 2.04 3.79 
14 1.50 1.00 2.41 0.91 0.41 3.00 2.50 0.91 2.41 
15 2.17 2.17 4.01 1.91 1.91 4.75 4.49 2.13 3.63 
16 2.17 2.17 4.01 1.91 1.91 4.75 4.49 2.13 3.63 
17 1.50 1.00 2.41 0.91 0.41 3.00 2.50 0.91 2.41 
 
The highest quality of life drives the selection of temporary housing accommodations at 
the household-level not considering other external factors. If only the quality of life was 
considered here, most units suggested are RAPIDO units, and a Katrina Cottage for households 
6, 11, and 12. If this were the case, 16,257 RAPIDO units would be needed and 3,142 Katrina 
Cottages for owner-occupied households and the total cost would be about $1.3 billion. Since 
this is not feasible with the specified budget, the units that produced the three highest qualities of 
life were considered reasonable options for the household to give more options to reduce 
spending. The temporary housing accommodations suggested the most one expanded to include 
options the top three qualities of life are again RAPIDO and Katrina Cottages, but also Multi-
Family Lease and Repair and Shelter at Home. In addition to a budget and the quality of life of 
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the household, unit feasibility must be taken into consideration, meaning the accommodation 
recommended for a particular household needs reflects the level of damage to their pre-disaster 
home. For example, a RAPIDO unit would not be feasible for a household who can repair their 
home with a reasonable number of repairs.  
In order to maximize the qualities of life and attempt to minimize the spending, RAPIDO 
units were restricted to only those in damage state 4 category assuming a new home is more 
financially feasible than repairing the severely damaged home. Katrina Cottages are restricted to 
those whose pre-disaster home is in damage state 3 assuming the repairs to be completed to the 
home are extensive and will take time but are reasonable to complete rather than receiving an 
entire new home. Both Katrina Cottages and RAPIDO units have been restricted to damage 
states 3 and 4 respectively also because of possible quantity limitations. It is assumed that not 
enough RAPIDO units or Katrina Cottages would be available, or could be manufactured and 
transported, to accommodate everyone in the entire community. Multi-Family Lease and Repair 
programs are also reasonable for some households in damage state 3, as well as damage state 2 
allowing households to reside in apartments included in the program while waiting for the 
completion of repairs. Assuming those whose pre-disaster home is in damage state 3 will remain 
in the temporary housing phase longer than those with damage state 2 damage, they will not be 
residing indefinitely, and an apartment inside of the community will allow them to have 
normalcy with every day activities. Shelter at Home program is a reasonable option for those in 
damage state 2. Damage state 2 is assumed to be the only damage state where repairs can be 
made for under $15,000. Temporary repairs can be made in an adequate timeframe getting 
households back into their pre-disaster home resuming their pre-disaster life style.  
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Considering these temporary housing accommodations as reasonable options based on 
the quality of life of those residing in them, and the assumed quantity limitations on RAPIDO 
units and Katrina Cottages, the following distribution, shown in table 19, can be an adequate 
solution for community-wide temporary housing assignments.  
Table 19. Temporary Housing Accommodation Recommendation 1 
Household Damage State 2 Damage State 3 Damage State 4 
1 Multi-Family Lease and Repair Katrina Cottage RAPIDO 
2 Shelter at Home Katrina Cottage RAPIDO 
3 Multi-Family Lease and Repair Katrina Cottage RAPIDO 
4 Multi-Family Lease and Repair Katrina Cottage RAPIDO 
5 Shelter at Home Katrina Cottage RAPIDO 
6 Shelter at Home Katrina Cottage RAPIDO 
7 Multi-Family Lease and Repair Katrina Cottage RAPIDO 
8 Multi-Family Lease and Repair Katrina Cottage RAPIDO 
9 Multi-Family Lease and Repair Katrina Cottage RAPIDO 
10 Shelter at Home Multi-Family Lease and Repair RAPIDO 
11 Shelter at Home Katrina Cottage RAPIDO 
12 Shelter at Home Katrina Cottage RAPIDO 
13 Multi-Family Lease and Repair Katrina Cottage RAPIDO 
14 Shelter at Home Multi-Family Lease and Repair RAPIDO 
15 Multi-Family Lease and Repair Katrina Cottage RAPIDO 
16 Multi-Family Lease and Repair Katrina Cottage RAPIDO 
17 Shelter at Home Multi-Family Lease and Repair RAPIDO 
 
The above temporary housing accommodation distribution results in the use of 4500 RAPIDO 
units, 7388 Katrina Cottages, 4725 Multi-Family Lease and Repair units occupied, and 2785 
Shelter at Home programs amounting to $946 million. The total cost for this recommendation is 
more than four times the budget specified of $205 million. In an effort to reduce the budget, an 
additional following community-wide recommendation was developed making finance the 
governing factor. The two lowest cost accommodations are the Shelter at Home program and 
Multi-Family Lease and Repair. Coincidently, both of these fall within the top three qualities of 
life for all 17 owner-occupied households, therefore the quality of life of residents is not forgone 
completely. Shelter at Home was considered for all household with damage state 2 pre-disaster 
homes, and Multi-Family Lease and Repair was considered for all households with pre-disaster 
homes in damage state 3 and 4. The total cost for this recommendation is about $309 million, 
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which is greatly reduced from the first temporary housing distribution option, but still about 
$100 million over budget.  
 Rental-occupied households were also considered. The households described in table 16 
with preferences as shown in table 17 are the same households evaluated for renter-occupied 
units as well. Households that were pre-disaster renters differ from owners in the types of 
temporary housing accommodations available to them. Without considering quality of life of the 
households, several of the temporary housing programs discussed and researched in this work are 
eliminated as options for renters. RAPIDO units and Katrina Cottages cannot be used since 
renters do not own property were the unit could be placed. Shelter at Home is not available to 
renters because they do not own the home; even remaining in a pre-disaster damaged home is not 
an option. Most decisions made for rental properties are made by landlords without considering 
the needs of the occupants (Kamel and Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004).  
Location is an issue with FEMA-issued manufactured housing units as well; the units 
cannot be placed on pre-disaster property, but FEMA-issued MHUs placed in group sites are an 
option to renters, considered inaccessible units. Along with FEMA-issued MHUs on group sites, 
hotel and Multi-Family Lease and Repair program are available to renters. Qualities of life were 





















1 2.17 5.01 2.41 1.91 
2 2.00 3.75 1.66 1.41 
3 2.00 4.58 1.91 1.41 
4 1.17 3.34 1.41 0.91 
5 2.00 3.58 1.41 1.41 
6 2.00 3.41 1.41 1.41 
7 2.17 5.18 2.41 1.91 
8 2.17 4.84 2.41 1.91 
9 2.00 3.91 1.66 1.41 
10 1.00 2.91 0.91 0.41 
11 2.00 3.41 1.41 1.41 
12 2.00 3.41 1.41 1.41 
13 2.17 4.34 2.16 1.91 
14 1.00 2.41 0.91 0.41 
15 2.17 4.01 1.91 1.91 
16 2.17 4.01 1.91 1.91 
17 1.00 2.41 0.91 0.41 
 
The Multi-Family Lease and Repair program creates the highest quality of life for all 17 
renter-occupied households; this option is also the least costly. Assuming there is no cap to the 
number of units included in the Multi-Family Lease and Repair program, the cost for all 10,225 
households is $167 million. If assuming the number of Multi-Family Lease and Repair units 
available is limited, an alternative recommendation is to use hotels for those who will need 
temporary housing accommodations for only a short period, those with a pre-disaster home in 
damage state 2 with plans for repair. Using hotels for those with damage state 2 homes leaves the 
Multi-Family Lease and Repair program units for those with damage states 3 and 4 homes. The 
cost for this alternative is $303 million. Hotel stays could extend to those with pre-disaster 
homes with plans for repair in damage states 3 and 4; however, since the quality of life in hotels 
are low so significant time spent in hotels would not be ideal for the household. The cost of 
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increasing hotel stays would also increase. One final option that can be considered are using 
FEMA MHUs if quantities are limited for both Multi-Family Lease and Repair program units 
and hotels. Hotels could be used for those with pre-disaster homes with plans for repairs in 
damage state 2, FEMA MHUs for those in damage state 3, and Multi-Family Lease and Repair 
program for those with damage state 4. This solution aims to balance quality of life with respect 
to how long households will reside in units with respect to the level of damage in pre-disaster 
homes. Hotels are suggested for households in damage state 2 assuming they would not be out of 
the home for a significant period of time. FEMA MHUs are suggested for damage state 3 
assuming households will be in temporary housing long enough to need a solution more 
permanent than a hotel. Multi-Family Lease and Repair program are suggested for those with a 
pre-disaster home in damage state 4 assuming these households will be in temporary housing the 
longest and therefore needed an accommodation that will maximize their quality life. The cost 
for this distribution, hotels for damage state 2 households, FEMA MHUs for damage state 3 
households, and Multi-Family Lease and Repair program units for 4 households, is $916 million. 
All three of these solutions exceed the specified budget of $107 million. The distribution that 
minimizes the cost for renter-occupied units is the first solution, with all households using Multi-
Family Lease and Repair program as temporary housing, exceeds the budget by about $60 
million.  
The community-level framework is developed to consider not only the quality of life of 
households in need of post-disaster temporary housing, but also to consider external community 
constraints such as budget which was exemplified in this example. For owner-occupied units, the 
community-level solution that provides adequate qualities of life while minimizing cost is using 
Shelter at Home program for those with a pre-disaster home in damage state 2 and Multi-Family 
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Lease and Repair program for those with a pre-disaster homes in damage states 2 and 3. This 
would require 5314 households using Shelter at Home and 14,085 residing in units included in 
the Multi-Family Lease and Repair program. For renter-occupied units, the distribution that 
minimizes cost, while providing the highest qualities of life of the programs available, is having 
all 10,225 households using the Multi-Family Lease and Repair program. With such a large 
number using the Multi-Family Lease and Repair program, other solutions were explored as 
discussed above, but all with increased cost.  
The community level example shows that even the recommendations for a community 
level-solution that minimizes cost still exceeded the given budget which was assumed based on 
data from the severe Louisiana floods in August 2016 (HUD, 2017). Having the lowest cost 
solution exceed the budget for both owner- and renter-occupied units solidifies two points. First, 
funds that are used post-disaster do not help all households in need of temporary housing units. If 
all households were given temporary housing accommodations, the total dollars spent in IHP 
programs would have to be much larger. Second, if communities want to be able to provide 
temporary housing solutions that creates a high quality of life for occupants, either more funds 
have to be allocated for post-disaster housing, or cheaper yet efficient temporary housing 
programs must be developed. With the budgetary restrictions specified in this example, it is 
impossible to provide an adequate unit, or a unit at all, to all households. There are limitations 
surrounding the costs of the distribution options, such as the cost estimates for the temporary 
housing accommodations may be based on maximum values rather than mean values, and in 
reality, not everyone is covered by disaster assistance funds. However, the community-level 
example demonstrates budget restrictions as a major factor driving the selection of temporary 
housing units. Another alarming depiction from the community-level analysis is the lack of 
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resources available to those who were pre-disaster renters. Half of the programs that are 
available and cater to pre-disaster owners are eliminated when considering renters. This lack of 
programs and resources solidifies the commonly observed vulnerability of renters and why their 
recovering is generally a harder and longer process compared to pre-disaster owners.  
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 Temporary housing is a post-disaster topic that has proved to have limited documentation 
and understanding. This research sought to fill a gap in current post-disaster research by 
designing an approach for selecting temporary housing options for disaster victims both at the 
household-level and at the community-level. A content-analysis of the literature was performed, 
mostly including public news articles, to uncover themes associated with household experiences 
with temporary housing. The identified themes informed the development of an integrated 
sustainability and resilience model built on quantifications of mostly qualitative data regarding 
characteristics of temporary housing units including adaptability, customizability, population 
stability, health impacts, environmental impacts, financial cost, structural integrity, and hazard 
vulnerability, which leads to the computation of an overall quality of life index. This wide array 
of temporary housing qualities are used in the model to show that post-disaster temporary 
housing is more than just a roof over disaster victims’ heads, and temporary housing has a 
greater meaning to households residing in them. Temporary housing is the transitional phase for 
households to gain somewhat of their normal pre-disaster lifestyle back. The more efficiently the 
temporary housing unit can provide this normalcy, the greater impact it will have on the 
household during recovery as exemplified through the quality of life index. The proposed 
approach was demonstrated with both common practices and innovative temporary housing 
solutions. Not only does the temporary housing unit contribute significantly to the quality of life 
index, but the type of household receiving the temporary housing unit affects it as well. In order 
to maximize the recovery process after a disaster, a household must be matched with a temporary 
housing unit that best fits their needs and produces the highest possible quality of life index for 
them. While aiming to provide the highest quality of life for a household, other external factors 
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typically drive the selection of post-disaster temporary housing accommodations. Budgetary 
restrictions, quantities of units available, and the time taken to receive the units are all 
community-level constraints that often times lead to households given temporary housing units 
that are readily available, and not one that fits their specific needs.  
Several conclusions can be drawn from the household-level and community-level analyses 
illustrated above. Each type of temporary housing unit, whether traditional or modern, has 
benefits in certain aspect over others. Custom built units, like the RAPIDO units, may seem like 
a positive solution for everyone, but when considering a particular household’s needs, this is not 
always the case. Households throughout a disaster stricken community do not have the same 
needs and therefore may not benefit from the exact same type of temporary housing 
accommodation. Household size, structure, income, insurance coverage, and level of damage to 
pre-disaster home can cause different households to have different post-disaster needs. 
Moreover, no two temporary housing solutions perform in the exact same manner for a particular 
household, and no two types produce the same exact quality of life index. The household-level 
analysis demonstrated the diversity of needs leading to differing temporary housing 
accommodation selections to different members of the community.  
While the household-level analysis proved that different temporary housing accommodations 
are recommended to different households, it is important to note that the solutions recommended 
were newer solutions that have been developed in place of the commonly used FEMA-issued 
manufactured homes and hotels. Based on the results of the household level analysis, the average 
quality of life for the commonly used temporary housing accommodations (e.g., manufactured 
housing units and hotel stays) was only 45.2% of the average quality of life index for newer 
programs such as Shelter at Home, Multi-Family Lease and Repair, RAPIDO, and Katrina 
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Cottage, with quality of life values averages of 2.08 and 4.60 respectively. These qualities of life 
comparisons show the importance of developing temporary housing programs and 
accommodations that aim to benefit the well-being of the recovering occupants. 
The community-level analysis takes the suggested accommodations at the household level 
and employs them to fit within their particular restraints and limitations. Budget restriction was 
explored in the community-level case study. Based on the findings from this analysis, the amount 
of dollars approved for an entire community is often times not enough to supply temporary 
housing to everyone in the community, much less provide an optimal temporary housing 
accommodation that will produce an adequate quality of life for the household. For the 
community-wide temporary housing distribution to owners, the cheapest option is 150% of the 
specified budget of $207 million. The other two options that maximize qualities of life are 650% 
and 460% of the budget. For renters, the cheapest option is 155% of the $107 million budget, 
with the other options at 851% and 281%. While there are limitations associated with the cost 
estimates, the community level analysis demonstrates the need for cheaper yet efficient 
temporary housing to accommodate often restricting budgets in housing recovery. 
The community-level analysis also shows the limitations of current temporary housing with 
regard to providing assistance to renters. Renters have less options for temporary housing since 
they do not own their pre-disaster home and decisions are governed by the landlord. Owners 
have a wide variety of options that take advantage of the pre-disaster home and property, while 
renters do not have this luxury. Considering the average quality of life of owners and renters, 
based on the community-level case study, renters have an average quality of life that is 59.0% of 
the quality of life of owners, 7.29 and 12.37 respectively. This proves the social vulnerability 
associated with pre-disaster renters during disaster recovery.  
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The purpose of this work is to aid community decision makers in either mitigation planning 
for future disasters, or to aid in response and recovery efforts post-disaster. The proposed 
approach can help communities develop a distribution that fits their population’s needs and their 
community-level needs and constraints as well. This can be done prior to a disaster to have a 
distribution plan in place in case of a disaster, or it can be used for hopefully quick deployment 
of units and accommodation assignments in the wake of disaster if units are readily available. 
The quicker households can be assigned and using their temporary housing accommodation, the 
quicker they can focus on rebuilding, finding a new home, or simply starting their everyday 
routines again. This model seeks to aid community leaders in proper planning and decision 
making in the wake of disaster to eliminate downtime in the recovery process of households 
while allowing them to receive a temporary housing accommodation that suits their needs and 
well-being.  
While the proposed framework includes a wide range of inputs that play a part in post-
disaster recovery and decision making, there are limitations and room for further development 
associated with the approach as well. First, the sustainability and resilience criteria should be 
further developed once more (intentional) data becomes available, and expanded to include other 
qualities such as the time taken to get households into a unit, the time spent in the unit, cultural 
appropriateness of the unit, community involvement in the program. Second, the weights applied 
in the model play the most important role in the major merit of this work: tying temporary 
housing selection to household preference. All preference weights exemplified in Chapter 5 were 
assigned based on expert opinion. Additional, intentional, research through field work or other 
survey mechanisms, is needed to support weight assignments, and ultimately to validate the 
model.  
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Model validation is the third limitation to this work, and is a limitation all new community-
level and resilience- and recovery-based frameworks are facing. The model developed here is 
grounded in fundamental social science, and built off of anecdotal evidence found mostly in 
news articles (i.e., not peer-reviewed literature). Future work is needed to collect the necessary 
data for model validation.  Nevertheless, this thesis serves as an important step forward, and will 
hopefully help motivate future research on the range of shortcomings identified in this thesis, 
including (1) systematic documentation of post-disaster temporary housing and household 
experience that is available to the research community; and (2) comprehensive and consistent 
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APPENDIX A. ATHENA IMPACT ESTIMATOR FOR BUILDINGS 
 ATHENA Impact Estimator for Buildings (2017) was used to perform to evaluate the 
environmental impacts of each temporary housing unit for all phases of the building: production, 
construction, use, and end of life. Found in this appendix are the assumed floor plans for each of 
the temporary housing unit structures: a single story single family dwelling for shelter at home 
and damaged home, a four-story apartment building for Multi-Family Lease and Repair program, 
a three-story hotel for hotel stays, a typical manufactured home floor plan for FEMA-issued 
manufactured home, a tiny home floorplan for a Katrina Cottage, and the provided floorplan for 
the RAPIDO core from the program website (Morales-Diaz , 2017). These floor plans aided in 
the ATHENA modeling of the building to determine the greenhouse gas emissions. In addition to 
the floor plans are step-by-step inputs used to model the structures and the output bill of 
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APPENDIX B. BUILDING PERFORMANCE CURVES 
HAZUS (DHS, 2015) building performance curves were originally adopted to measure 
the hazard vulnerability of the temporary housing units for a wind hazard event. Figure 11 
reproduces the building performance curves from HAZUS for building samples that closely 
match the units in consideration. The marginally engineered building represents the apartment 
building and hotel with four stories and three stories respectively. The residential building 
represents the single-family dwelling home. Two performance curves were pulled for the 
manufactured homes, one meeting pre-HUD standards, and one meeting 1994 HUD standards2. 
To evaluate the hazard vulnerability of the temporary housing units according to the 
measurement described in chapter 4 with equations 8 and 9, the 50th percentile wind speed of 
each unit at each damage state should be recorded. However, with the building performance 
curves shown, 1994 HUD manufactured housing units significantly outperform the marginally 
engineered buildings and residential home in each damage state which seems counterintuitive. 
To reduce this gap, the pre-HUD building performance curves for manufactured homes were 
examined more closely under the assumption that possibly not all manufactured units distributed 
as temporary housing would be up to the 1994 standards. While the wind speeds are reduced for 
pre-HUD manufactured homes, they still are shown to outperform the other buildings in 
consideration.  
 
                                                 
2 Manufactured homes built after 1976 are referred to as “HUD-code homes.” Units built prior to 1976 are 
considered “pre-HUD homes.” HUD changed its wind load requirements in 1994; therefore, those referred to as 
“1994 HUD” have the most up to date wind load design as specified by HUD. 
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Figure 11. Damage State Fragility Functions (DHS, 2015) 
Other building performance curves were investigated for residential building to explore if 
curves existed for residential buildings performing better than the manufactured home curves 
from HAZUS (DHS, 2015). Ellington et al (2004), Dong and Li (2016), and Lee and Rowosky 
(2005) were all consulted, but these did not have the depth needed to evaluate the hazard 
vulnerability of all types of temporary housing units with consistency. Ellington et al (2004) 
designed fragility curves for different structural elements of a building, such as a roof panel, and 
a roof to wall connection, not for the building as an entire unit. Dong and Li (2016) had the same 
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limitation with respect to evaluating hazard vulnerability with fragility curves for elements such 
as sheathing and roof covering, and Lee and Rowosky (2005) discuss roof sheathing 
complementary fragilities. 
A combination of curves from various sources could have been used to achieve the depth 
needed; however, different studies and simulations have different assumptions, methods, and test 
building dimensions, so assuming accuracy across these varying sources prove to make the 
information obsolete. With these hurdles in building performance data, the hazard vulnerability 
for all the temporary housing options was set to unity for the household-level example until more 
in-depth data can be collected in this regard. The development of measuring hazard vulnerability 
in this research can only be as accurate as the building performance used for evaluation; 
therefore, more research and development in this area is crucial to the proper outputs of the 
model developed. 
 
